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In a post-Class Action Fairness Act world, the modern mass-tort class
action is disappearing. Indeed, multi-district litigation and private
aggregation through contracts with plaintifs' law firms are the new mass-tort
frontier. But something's amiss with this "nonclass aggregation." These new
procedures involve a fundamentally different dynamic than class actions:
plaintiffs have names, faces, and something deeply personal at stake. Their
claims are independently economically viable, which gives them autonomy
expectations about being able to control the course of their litigation. Yet, they
participate in a familiar, collective effort to establish the defendant's liability.
They litigate from both a personal and a collective standpoint.
Current scholarship overlooks this inter-personal dimension. It focuses
instead on either touting the virtues of individual autonomy or streamlining
mass litigation to maximize social welfare. Both approaches fail to solve the
unique problems caused by these personal dimensions: temptations for
plaintiffs to hold out and thus derail settlements demanding near unanimity,
outliers who remain disengaged from the group but free-ride off of its efforts,
and subgroups within the litigation whose members compete for resources and
litigation dominance to the group's detriment. Accordingly, this Article has
two principal objectives: one diagnostic, one prescriptive. The diagnosis is
this: current procedures for handling nonclass aggregation miss the mark.
Process is not just an exercise in autonomy or a handy crutch for enforcing
substantive laws. Procedures can serve as a means for bringing plaintiffs
together, plugging their individual stories into a collective narrative, making
sense of that narrative as a community, reasoning together about the right
thing to do, and pursuing that end collectively. Thus, the prescription is
litigating together.
INTRODUCTION
The mass-tort class action as we know it is virtually extinct. Without it,
lawyers are scrambling for new ways to achieve the finality that class actions
once afforded. In its place, lawyers use multi-district litigation and design
settlements that deter plaintiffs from opting out. But the very design features
that create finality tend to strong-arm plaintiffs into accepting agreements that
might not be in their best interests. Consider the recent Vioxx settlement that
required plaintiffs' attorneys to recommend the deal to 100% of their clients
and to withdraw from representing those clients who refused.' Many Vioxx
I Vioxx Settlement Agreement, § 1.2.8.1-2 (Nov. 9, 2007) (initial settlement agreement,
Vioxx Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 05-01657 (E.D. La.)), available at http://www.officialvioxx
settlement.com. After some plaintiffs' attorneys contended the settlement conflicted with
ethical rules, it was reinterpreted to mean that the attorneys should recommend the deal only
if it was in the client's best interest. Cf Alex Berenson, Lawyers Seek to Alter Settlement
Over Vioxx, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 21, 2007, at C4 (discussing how the agreement prevented
attorneys from offering the best independent judgment for each client).
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LITIGATING TOGETHER
plaintiffs had independently economically marketable cases with product-
liability, personal-injury, and failure-to-warn claims. Yet, their attorneys and
the system pooled them together through multi-district litigation to tell a
collective, dismal story of product failure; benefit from joint discovery; and
level the playing field against Merck. Nonclass aggregation like this forces
mass-tort attorneys to confront the human element of litigation head-on. These
plaintiffs have names and faces and concerns; these are not the absent class
members of the past: they care and they're present.
Nonclass aggregation creates an uneasy union between the individual and
the collective. On one hand, we're social creatures. But on the other, we are
autonomous individuals who want to make our own decisions, direct the
course of our lives, and, when necessary, initiate our own litigation -
particularly when it involves something as deeply personal as our health or
safety. Thus, we live our lives from two perspectives: the personal and the
collective. We are independent and interdependent. Litigating together, like
so many other activities, mixes personal goals and group efforts that ultimately
lead to "us" pursuing "our" objective. But sometimes our personal ends mesh
with others' ends and sometimes they don't. This Article explores the
problems and complexity forged by this basic intersection of the personal and
the collective in large-scale, nonclass aggregation.
Perhaps this complexity is so obvious that we need not say anymore about
it. Aggregating claims means bringing together many people, players, and
agents; it's thorny and people's motivations are complicated. Or maybe that
complexity is easily suppressed by using external judicial and procedural
coercion to stifle dissent. But once we recognize that mass-tort litigation is
complex because it lumps together many people's distinct preferences, we
begin to see that an externally coercive approach can cause problems of its
own. Dissatisfied litigants and attorneys initiate collateral actions attacking the
first action's procedures and fairness; in the wake of Hansberry v. Lee,2 these
actions raise issues of preclusion, due process, and adequate representation in
other fora.3 These repeated challenges to the handling of large-scale litigation
begin to chip away at the legal system's credibility and legitimacy, which
ultimately makes peace and finality for defendants illusory.
So perhaps the answer lies in exploring this complexity. Understanding
what makes aggregate litigation complex from a group-orientation perspective
can help us formulate more realistic and useful propositions about how the
2 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
3 Id. at 40-44. Epstein v. MCA, Inc., has, however, limited the availability of collateral
attack in the class action context. 179 F.3d 641, 648 (9th Cir. 1999); see also Samuel
Issacharoff & Richard A. Nagareda, Class Settlements Under Attack, 156 U. PA. L. REv.
1649, 1685-91 (2008) ("Evaluating interclass conflicts from the time of the class settlement,
by contrast [to collateral attacks that take place afterwards], brings the adequacy analysis
into line with the uncertainty that underlies all manner of settlement .... ).
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aggregation process should work. Of course, some existing theories already
explain the basic interactions. For instance, game theory using prisoners'
dilemmas helps us understand bilateral, strategic interactions. But our
traditional analytic tools break down when many people interact - multiple
claimants, attorneys, defendants, and judges. Unlike its bilateral plaintiff-
versus-defendant counterpart, mass litigation is complex because of the
number of principals and agents, their diversity, and their interdependence. 4
Accordingly, in this Article, the third in a trilogy,5 I explore this
interdependence in terms of social norms, moral duties, and legal obligations.
In so doing, I have two principal objectives: one diagnostic, one prescriptive.
The diagnosis is this: current procedures for handling nonclass aggregation
miss the mark. Our conventional perspectives - individual autonomy and
social-welfare maximization - fail to capture fully the interaction between the
collective standpoint and the personal standpoint. Mass litigation is not just
about a payday for attorneys, closure for defendants, or even compensation for
plaintiffs. Procedural handling of mass litigation can serve as a means for
4 See J.B. Ruhl, Law's Complexity: A Primer, 24 GA. ST. L. REV. 885, 889 (2008) ("Most
actors in the legal system interact in this . . . context in which there are too many interacting
agents to fit neatly into bilateral models . . . ."); see also JOHN H. MILLER & ScoTT E. PAGE,
COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS: AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPUTATIONAL MODELS OF SOCIAL
LIFE 221 (2007).
5 The first article in the trilogy is Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Procedural Justice in
Nonclass Aggregation, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1 (2009) [hereinafter Procedural Justice],
which explains in depth the problems and risks presented by nonclass aggregation. It
observes that systemic legitimacy and compliance with judicial decisions hinges on ensuring
procedural justice, but that our current system for handling large-scale litigation fails to
provide a number of key procedural justice components including the preference for
adversarial litigation, participation opportunities, impartiality, and error correction. These
institutional shortcomings are due in large part to the trade-offs inherent in large-scale
litigation. Those trade-offs include that:
[L]itigation is no longer adversarial despite litigants' preferences, but effective
individual litigation is too costly to pursue; aggregate settlements provide few
participation opportunities for participation and no avenues for appeal or error
correction despite potential conflicts, but without aggregate settlements, cost and delay
could be staggering and the relief may come too late; mediators or special masters
might afford claimants additional participatory opportunities, but process is then less
adversarial and may suffer from legitimacy problems.
Id. at 46. The second article in the trilogy is Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Litigating Groups,
61 ALA. L. REV. 1 (2009) [hereinafter Litigating Groups]. A summary of the principal
claims in the second Article is laid out in the text of this Article. I have also summarized
those contentions in a short response to Judge Weinstein's article, Jack B. Weinstein,
Preliminary Reflections on Administration of Complex Litigations, 2009 CARDOzo L. REV.
DE NOVO 1, 3, http://www.cardozolawreview.com/content/denovo/WEINSTEIN 2009_1.
pdf. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, A New Way Forward: A Response to Judge Weinstein,
2009 CARDozo L. REV. DE NOVO 168.
[Vol. 91: 8790
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bringing plaintiffs together, plugging their individual stories into a collective
narrative, making sense of that narrative as a community, reasoning together
about the right thing to do, and pursuing that end with collective force.
By confronting and grappling with the transformative nature of social
relationships, this Article's approach differs from those proposed by Professors
Coffee,6 Erichson, 7 Issacharoff,8 Nagareda,9 Redish, 0 and Rosenberg," yet
each author might find some harmony between "litigating together" and the
axioms of their theories.12 In this Article's predecessor, Litigating Groups, I
laid the theoretical groundwork for this approach by borrowing insights from
social psychology, moral and political philosophy, and behavioral law and
economics, and by bringing those notions of commitment, community, and
groups to bear on nonclass aggregation.' 3 I argued that groups of plaintiffs
may have or could be encouraged to develop organic or indigenous origins
such that they form moral obligations to one another that are reinforced by
social and personal norms.
My prescriptive objective is to enable plaintiffs to litigate together and self-
govern through social norms and deliberative democracy ideals, such as
arguing, bargaining, and voting. These features embody fair process and place
plaintiffs in a better position to overcome standard collective-action problems.
This Article translates the theoretical foundation laid in Litigating Groups into
concrete, feasible procedures for litigating together. Although Litigating
Groups maintained that plaintiffs who form groups will likely develop other-
regarding preferences toward fellow group members, it did not: fully formulate
procedures for promoting cooperation and group formation; decide when,
whether, or how to impose sanctions when norms and moral obligations fail;
6 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and
Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 370, 380 (2000).
7 Howard Erichson has long discussed the problems inherent in nonclass aggregation.
See, e.g., Howard M. Erichson, Beyond the Class Action: Lawyer Loyalty and Client
Autonomy in Non-Class Collective Representation, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 519, 526.
8 See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Class Action Conflicts, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 805, 809
(1997) [hereinafter Issacharoff, Class Action Conflicts]; Samuel Issacharoff, Governance
and Legitimacy in the Law of Class Actions, 1999 SUP. CT. REv. 337,337 (1999).
9 See, e.g., RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETTLEMENT 269
(2007).
10 See, e.g., MARTIN H. REDISH, WHOLESALE JUSTICE: CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY AND
THE PROBLEM OF THE CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT 20 (2009).
" See, e.g., David Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation Class Action: The Only Option for
Mass Tort Cases, 115 HARv. L. REV. 831, 833-34 (2002).
12 I explore this potential harmony in this Article's Conclusion.
13 Litigating Groups, supra note 5, at 20; see also Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Group
Consensus, Individual Consent, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 101 (forthcoming February 2011),
available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1552462 [hereinafter Group Consensus, Individual
Consent].
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contemplate incentives to join the group; or determine when exiting the group
is appropriate. Accordingly, this Article takes up those hard questions as well
as the challenge of determining whether and how substantive and procedural
law should enforce moral obligations once a certain level of moral
interconnectedness exists.
This Article contends that process should enable plaintiffs amassed through
nonclass aggregation to reason together about "the right thing to do" and to
design a governance arrangement that embodies the plaintiffs' shared
conception of fairness. This normative position rests on the following three
premises. First, cooperation increases with sociality, particularly when a group
member is acting toward fellow group members. 14 Because plaintiffs are often
geographically disaggregated, they are unlikely to socialize or exhibit the
fundamental attributes of a cohesive, local community such as social bonds,
group activities, and communal attachment. They thus lose the benefits they
would receive by cooperating - fewer holdouts, fewer informational
asymmetries, fewer transaction costs, greater bargaining and litigating power,
and greater ability to monitor their attorneys. Accordingly, judges should
facilitate opportunities for aggregated plaintiffs to socialize, communicate, and
form groups.
Second, plaintiffs who communicate with one another tend to promise each
other that they will work together to achieve their joint ends. This means two
things: (1) once a certain level of moral interconnectedness and group cohesion
is present, a combination of social norms and contractual schemes might
reinforce those obligations, and (2) for that to happen, the system must allow
plaintiffs to self-govern, and it must be willing to respect (and sometimes
enforce) the plaintiffs' decisions.
Third, because the right to sue in tort is held individually, if a procedurally
aggregated plaintiff wants no part in the group's collective efforts, then she
should be allowed to remain a distinct, autonomous agent. The group might
try to entice these outliers into its ranks through the allure of sharing costs,
overcoming informational asymmetries, and leveraging economies of scale to
achieve substantive ends. But if a plaintiff wants to remain an outlier, that is
her right. Plus, allowing outliers to stay outsiders serves an important error-
correction function: outliers, like bona-fide objectors in class-action
settlements, can provide a dissenting voice questioning the settlement's
substantive fairness.
To achieve these diagnostic and prescriptive aims, this Article rests on a few
assumptions. I take a pluralistic perspective of the tort system's nature and
purpose and contend that the government has legitimate interest in promoting
14 Elinor Ostrom, Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms, 14 J. EcoN.
PERSP. 137, 140 (2000) ("Those who believe others will cooperate in social dilemmas as
more likely to cooperate themselves."); Lynn A. Stout, Social Norms and Other-Regarding
Preferences, in NORMS AND THE LAW 13, 22-23 (John N. Drobak, ed. 2006).
92 [Vol. 91: 87
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discourse among plaintiffs about "the right thing to do," though I make few
claims about what the right thing is. Further, the judicial system's principal
goal is to promote justice by enforcing substantive rights and responsibilities.
By simultaneously advancing their own litigation objectives, plaintiffs and
defendants further this end. Moreover, I assume a prototypical aggregate
lawsuit where many plaintiffs bring tort claims against a corporate defendant
and specific causation issues, different state laws, or other manageability
concerns preclude class certification.
This Article unfolds across four Parts. Part I explains the impetus for
change. It examines the institutional backdrop of nonclass aggregation and the
moving parts that make it so complex. These include the litigation's maturity
and the interactions between key players - plaintiffs, attorneys, defendants, and
judges. The latter divides into agency problems (between the attorney and her
clients), group problems (between plaintiffs), and competition problems
(between plaintiffs' attorneys).
Part II summarizes the moral, political, and legal philosophy that animates
this project's prescription of litigating together. When plaintiffs share their
stories and communicate with one another about their litigation objectives,
they may begin to see themselves as part of a community of sorts. As such,
they regularly commit to cooperate. These commitments range from tacit
agreements, to reciprocal understandings, to explicit promises, to formal
contractual arrangements. Because these commitments follow from voluntary
actions, they thus preserve the liberal ethos of consent, albeit in a loose way.
And once plaintiffs make reciprocal promises and assurances to cooperate with
each other, they incur communal obligations. They are thus no longer morally
free to leave the group when doing so would violate their obligations of
solidarity or membership.
Part III develops this prescription by sketching a model for cooperatively
litigating together and considering possible objections based on feasibility,
group polarization, and the potential for a passionate few to exploit the group.
Using a special officer, facilitating communication, and promoting deliberative
decision-making minimizes the informational asymmetries and helps overcome
the collective-action problems that make plaintiffs poor monitors.
Implementing these measures would enable plaintiffs litigating together to co-
specify their ends, avoid bounded rationality, sort themselves into more
cohesive groups, find creative solutions, and govern themselves. Depending
on the group, self-governance might take place through social norms and social
sanctions or through a formal, collective decision-making arrangement. Part
III also injects a dose of realism into this archetype. It recognizes that we live
within a heterogeneous population with myriad motivations and that increased
group size negatively correlates with cooperation. Accordingly, it maps the
theoretical and legal justification for binding diverse collective interests and
suggests how we might use carrots (incentives to outliers to join the group),
2011] 93
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sticks (sanctions for opportunistic holdouts), and doors (exit as a signaling
function) to reinforce that bond.
Finally, Part IV concludes by illustrating how the spillovers from
cooperatively litigating together alleviate the problems expounded in Part I.
More specifically, it reconceptualizes how the Vioxx litigation would have
been resolved under this new framework.
I. NONCLASS AGGREGATION'S PREVALENCE AND PROBLEMS
Nonclass aggregation is a shorthand term for claims that the Judicial Panel
on Multidistrict Litigation aggregates for coordinated pretrial handling that are
not certified as class actions. As used here, the term principally refers to
typical mass-tort claims, such as personal-injury, product-liability, and failure-
to-warn claims. The upshot of the Supreme Court's decisions in Amchem
Products, Inc. v. Windsor and Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.,16 and of Congress
passing the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA),17 is that few mass-tort cases
will proceed as certified class actions.
Recent empirical evidence tells us this much: the number of personal-injury
and product-liability cases consolidated through multi-district litigation has
increased, while the number of motions for class certification has decreased.18
Without the closure that a class settlement once delivered, attorneys on both
sides of the aisle are turning to private contracts to achieve finality.
Specifically, they are experimenting with a new breed of settlement terms to
prevent plaintiffs from opting-out: walk-away provisions that allow the
defendant to exit the litigation if fewer than a specified percentage of the
claimants sign-on, liens on the defendant's assets in favor of the settling
plaintiffs, and most-favored-nation provisions that give settling plaintiffs the
equivalent of any benefits that others might achieve by opting out.19
What this means for plaintiffs is that, despite having an individual
contractual relationship with their chosen attorney, the attorney typically
IS Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 597 (1997) (finding that attempted
settlement of current and future asbestos-related claims does not satisfy Rule 23's class
certification requirements).
16 Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 864 (1999) ("[T]he applicability of Rule
23(b)(1)(B) to a fund and plan purporting to liquidate actual and potential tort claims is
subject to question .... .").
11 Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
18 Thomas E. Willging & Emery G. Lee III, From Class Actions to Multidistrict
Consolidations: Aggregate Mass Tort Litigation After Ortiz, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 775, 776
(2010).
1 For an overview of how these provisions exert ethical pressure on plaintiffs' counsel,
see Howard M. Erichson, The Trouble with All-or-Nothing Settlements, 58 U. KAN. L. REV.
979,982-1006 (2010).
[Vol. 91: 8794
HeinOnline -- 91 B.U. L. Rev. 94 2011
LITIGATING TOGETHER
represents hundreds of other nominally related clients. 20 It also means that
attenuated attorney-client relationships inhibit a client's ability to monitor her
case as she would in an individual lawsuit. In a certified class action, the judge
would act as a surrogate by monitoring class counsel and ensuring that the
settlement terms are fair.21 But as nonclass aggregation, these cases lack Rule
23's judicial oversight. In short, nonclass aggregation falls into a procedural
no-man's-land. It presents collective-action and agency problems similar to
those in class actions, but lacks both individual client monitors and Rule 23's
judicial quality-control measures. 22 The resulting problems divide into two
moving parts: (1) the litigation's stage and maturity level, and (2) the
interrelationships between the key players.
A. Aggregation Itself and the Litigation's Maturity
The first moving part involves the decision to aggregate and the litigation's
maturity. Claim initiation, initial aggregation, post-aggregation, and settlement
each present unique concerns. For instance, initiating a lawsuit raises
questions about whether to litigate individually or collectively, which claims to
bring, which attorney to hire, and how best to communicate and attain
plaintiffs' litigation goals. Attorneys filing similar claims across the country
signal aggregation potential. The Judicial Panel on Multi-District Litigation
then decides whether and where to transfer nominally related cases. 23 This
20 Plaintiffs might retain attorneys because of the attorneys' advertised expertise; a group
of plaintiffs might seek collective representation (an "aggregate lawsuit"); plaintiffs' law
firms may work together informally on similar cases (a "private aggregation"); or court-
mandated multi-district transfer and consolidation might bring plaintiffs and their attorneys
together ("administrative aggregation"). PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG. §
1.02 (proposed final draft April 1, 2009).
21 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e), (g), (h).
22 There are a few notable exceptions. Both Judge Weinstein in the Zyprexa litigation
and Judge Fallon in the Vioxx litigation have likened nonclass aggregation to class-action
litigation, calling it a "quasi-class action." They thus use equitable authority to monitor the
litigation. In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 433 F. Supp. 2d 268, 271 (E.D.N.Y. 2006)
("While the settlement in the instant action is in the nature of a private agreement between
individual plaintiffs and the defendant, it has many of the characteristics of a class action; it
may be characterized properly as a quasi-class action subject to the general equitable power
of the court."); In re Vioxx Prod. Liab. Litig., 574 F. Supp. 2d 606, 611-12 (E.D. La. 2008)
(comparing the case to Zyprexa and concluding that "the Vioxx global settlement may
properly be analyzed as occurring in a quasi-class action, giving the Court equitable
authority . . ."); see also L. Elizabeth Chamblee [Burch], Unsettling Efficiency: When Non-
Class Aggregation of Mass Torts Creates Second-Class Settlements, 65 LA. L. REv. 157, 241
(2004) ("[M]ultidistrict process should also permit judicial approval of settlements ... [to]
ensure that similarly situated individuals receive equal fairness protections regardless of
how the courts aggregated the litigation.").
23 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2006).
952011]
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prompts questions about whose interests aggregation serves (courts, plaintiffs,
defendants, or attomeys), whether aggregating has become so automatic that
decision-makers no longer carefully evaluate the ends served, and whether
aggregating ultimately promotes the normative ends of achieving justice,
however defined.24
Post-aggregation concems might include continuing doubt about
aggregating initially; whether and how aggregating affects substantive law;
whether plaintiffs share desires, intentions, plans, or policies; whether
plaintiffs recognize and profit from those shared traits; and whether plaintiffs'
normative stories mesh or aggregating undermines their litigation ends. Next,
when the defendant proposes a settlement, it raises both substantive fairness
questions and procedural allocation concems, including: whether the
settlement is fair and fair to whom; whether it satisfies plaintiffs' substantive
goals; whether individual objections should be sacrificed for the collective
good; and what role the plaintiffs and their attomeys should play in designing
and implementing collective decision-making procedures.
These concems raise broader questions about the legitimacy of adjudication
procedures during each stage. Procedural-justice research indicates that
litigants prefer: (1) an adversarial system before an impartial decision-maker
with error-correcting mechanisms such as new trials and appeals; (2) either
well-established court rules or the ability to participate in designing dispute-
resolution procedures; and (3) an opportunity to take part and be heard in the
adjudicatory or deliberation process.25 Yet, judicial handling of mass litigation
is often at odds with these preferences. 26 Litigation is increasingly inquisitorial
despite an adversarial veneer.27  Compensation grids and confidential
settlements have replaced traditional error-correction mechanisms. 28
Participation and voice opportunities wane as the number of litigants increase
and attorneys find it increasingly taxing to communicate with their clients.
Finally, judicial impartiality may be compromised by self-interest, demands for
systemic efficiency, and the lack of quality information.2 9
24 For instance, institutional designers should reevaluate the imperative in the Manual for
Complex Litigation, which states: "Pretrial proceedings in [related] cases should be
coordinated or consolidated under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a), even if the cases
are filed in more than one division of the court." MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION
(FOURTH) § 10.123 (2004).
25 Procedural Justice, supra note 5, at 29-43.
26 Id at 45.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 46; Issacharoff, Class Action Conflicts, supra note 8, at 829 (discussing how
courts are overworked, have limited access to quality information, and strive to quickly
clear their dockets); Richard A. Nagareda, Turning From Tort to Administration, 94 MICH.
L. REv. 899,968 (1996).
96 [Vol. 91: 87
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These findings lead to three principal risks. First, plaintiffs may view the
process as illegitimate.30 That typically means that they will express their
dissatisfaction and disenchantment in a public way, through blogs or media
outlets, or collaterally attacking the settlement by filing competing claims in
other jurisdictions (usually state courts). This offsets some of the initial
efficiency gains achieved by aggregating. Second, increasingly creative
procedures such as bellwether trials and statistical sampling may make process
less predictable and may make substantive liability more difficult to avoid
through modifying one's behavior.31  Finally, both of the first two risks
combine to corrode public support for the judicial system, which means that
the system itself risks its legitimacy. 32
B. Interrelationships Between Key Players
The second moving part - the interdependence between key players -
further complicates these timing and maturity questions. Key players include
plaintiffs, defendants, their attorneys, and judges. Their interactions raise three
principal issues for plaintiffs: agency problems arising between attorneys and
their clients, group problems between plaintiffs and other plaintiffs, and
competition problems between plaintiffs' attorneys.
1. Agency Problems
Agency problems in the lawyer-client relationship include: conflicts
between the attorney's self-interest and the clients' best interest; how to
effectively and ethically represent multiple clients when one client's best
interest conflicts with the majority's best interest; and how to fairly allocate
settlement proceeds among clients. Viewed as an adequate-representation
problem, unresolved conflicts between principals - the clients - may
undermine the adequacy of the agent's representation and thereby violate due
process as well as the professional-conduct rules. Moreover, although
aggregating clients makes litigation economically viable and more efficient, it
makes effective client monitoring nearly impossible.
Large-scale litigation augments the fiduciary aspect of the typical lawyer-
client agency relationship by making the attorney the financier. She is both an
agent and a creditor; the litigation is a joint venture. 33  This tangled
30 Burch, Procedural Justice, supra note 5, at 46.
31 Id.
32 Id.
3 See Charles Silver, Merging Roles: Mass Tort Lawyers as Agents and Trustees, 31
PEPP. L. REv. 301, 302-03 (2003) (positing that Coffee's argument applies with equal force
to mass-tort representations because "[t]he plaintiffs' attorneys provide crucial financing");
Kutak Symposium: Professional Responsibility and the Corporate Lawyer, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHics 331, 340-41 (2000) (transcribed comments by Professor John C. Coffee, Jr.)
(observing the same phenomenon in the class-action context). Yet, getting rid of the
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relationship can motivate her to cherry-pick stronger cases for trial or settle on
the cheap if it means she can take her contingency fee quickly and move on to
other cases. Thus, in performing these dual rules, the attorney's loyalty divides
not only between clients, but also between clients and self-interest.
Additional conflicts can arise over trial strategies, litigation goals, and when
and how to settle. Even when overarching goals mesh, the means for
achieving them may differ. Consider, for example, the Bendectin litigation.34
After giving birth to a son with missing fingers and a shortened arm, Betty
Mekdeci initiated the Bendectin litigation by contacting the "King of Torts,"
Melvin Belli.35 Her case went to trial despite proof problems and the jury's
verdict essentially amounted to a loss: $20,000 to her, but nothing for her
son.36 Although the judge granted her a new trial, her lawyers wanted to
postpone it and proceed with stronger cases first. 37 Mekdeci refused. Her
lawyers then tried to withdraw, provoking the Eleventh Circuit to dub it an
"extraordinary tale" of abandonment.38 Belli claimed, "Mekdeci was too
difficult to work with, that her case was not that strong, and that he was turning
his attention to two hundred similar cases."39
Mekdeci's story starkly illustrates the disconnect that can arise between
agents and principles in mass litigation and, ultimately, the desire to connect
with and help others with similar experiences. After the litigation ended,
Mekdeci and her husband founded Birth Defect Research for Children, Inc. to
provide "parents and expectant parents with information about birth defects
and support services," administer a "parent-matching program that links
families who have children with similar birth defects," and offer technical
assistance in collecting and analyzing data from communities with an increase
in birth defects. 40 Mekdeci's case also begs the question of whether the
contingency fee and attorney financing is not a realistic solution.
34 Mekdeci v. Merrell Nat'1 Lab., 711 F.2d 1510 (11th Cir. 1983).
1 Id. at 1516; see also JOSEPH SANDERS, BENDECTIN ON TRIAL: A STUDY OF MASS TORT
LITIGATION 6-7 (1998).
36 MICHAEL D. GREEN, BENDECTIN AND BIRTH DEFECTS: THE CHALLENGES OF MASS
Toxic SUBSTANCES LITIGATION 131 (1996); SANDERS, supra note 35, at 2-15 (chronicling the
Mekdeci's case, including the jury verdict that failed to provide damages to their son);
Richard L. Marcus, Reexamining the Bendectin Litigation Story, 83 IOWA L. REV. 231, 234-
36 (1997) ("Given the huge out-of-pocket costs incurred by Mekdeci's Florida lawyers to
take the case to trial - approximately $150,000 - this outcome was extremely
disappointing.").
3 Marcus, supra note 36, at 236.
18 Mekdeci, 711 F.2d at 1516.
39 Id.
40 BIRTH DEFECT RESEARCH FOR CHILDREN, INC., http://www.birthdefects.org/story/ (last
visited Oct. 25, 2010).
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attorney can legitimately elevate the group's interests over the individual's. 41
This litigation provoked Richard Marcus to observe that "Mekdeci's case
provides some reason for feeling that client desires may legitimately be
conditioned on the 'greater good' of the overall plaintiff group." 42
2. Group Problems
As Mekdeci's case suggests, multiple plaintiffs create additional problems.
Group problems include: (1) outliers, those who do not join the group or
consider themselves group members; (2) holdouts, those who join the group
but want to exit or withhold consent to a settlement offer (for a myriad of
legitimate and illegitimate reasons); and (3) plaintiffs'-side subgroup
competition.
As to outliers, not all plaintiffs consider themselves group members. Some
remain outside the group while others are "individuals-within-the-collective,"
who either compete with other litigants or want to maximize their own
outcome without regard to others.43  Without the opportunity to meet,
collaborate, or share relevant experiences, plaintiffs may never form a group.
Their individual interests may align and overlap, but they may not recognize it.
Thus, meeting one another and discussing their goals and experiences stimulate
group formation. With that opportunity, they might reconsider their initial
decision to litigate on their own or collaborate for instrumental reasons if doing
so maximizes their outcome.44
The second problem - holdouts - is troubling only if we assume that a
settlement offer is objectively fair to all involved. When defendants decide to
settle, they want finality. They thus want to sweep as many plaintiffs as
possible under the settlement rug. Thus enters the "holdout." When settlement
offers are conditioned on unanimous or nearly unanimous consent or include
walk-away provisions that allow the defendant to withdraw its offer if less than
the requisite number of plaintiffs agrees, holdouts can withhold their consent
41 See Erichson, supra note 7, at 558-60.
42 Marcus, supra note 36, at 252.
43 See Burch, Litigating Groups, supra note 5, at 33-34; see also Kwok Leung, Kwok-Kit
Tong & E. Allan Lind, Realpolitik Versus Fair Process: Moderating Effects of Group
Identification on Acceptance ofPolitical Decisions, 3 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL.
476, 476-77 (2007) (suggesting that individuals who do not identify with their own group
will be less concerned about fairness to others). Group-oriented individuals and individuals-
within-the-collective are best conceived not as a dichotomy, but as points along a spectrum
of group cohesion. For more information about this spectrum, see Burch, Procedural
Justice, supra note 5, at 15-24.
" See Erick van Dijk & David De Cremer, Tacit Coordination and Social Dilemmas: On
the Importance of Self-Interest and Fairness, in SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND ECONOMICS 141,
146-47 (David De Cremer et al. eds., 2006).
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and demand a disproportionately high payoff. Enough holdouts could derail
the whole settlement.
Holdouts and outliers who disagree with or are unconscious of the principal
group may form their own groups.45 Thus enters the third potential group
problem: subgroup competition. Subgroups may unite over ideology and may
compete with the principal plaintiff group or other subgroups for resources,
dominance, and membership. Larger-sized groups tend to be less cooperative
than smaller and mid-sized groups, which suggests that sizeable aggregations
will encounter increased division. 46 Subgroup formation and competition are
further complicated by blurred boundaries where some members are more
prototypical than others and members belong to multiple groups.47
3. Competition Problems
In a capitalistic society, we tend to think positively of competition,
particularly competition between entrepreneurial plaintiffs' law firms.
Generally speaking, competing attorneys reduce legal costs, increase access to
the system, produce better quality legal arguments, spur innovation and
creativity, and thereby further the ends of justice. Moreover, competition can
undercut the possibility and appearance of collusion between plaintiffs' and
defense counsel. The wrestling match over the lead-plaintiff position in
securities class actions is a notable and visible example. Yet, there is a fine
line between zealously advocating for one's clients and acting strategically to
ensure a higher attorney's fee.
The continuum thus has two extremes. At one end, competition produces
(for better or worse) overlapping actions, opt-outs, and collateral attacks
pursued not for the client's best interest, but for a higher fee. At the other anti-
competitive end, tacit agreements and negotiated fee-sharing arrangements that
further plaintiffs' counsels' collective self-interest raise the question of
collusion.48  This arrangement between repeat players suggests that even
separate representation for competing subgroups or subclasses may
conveniently mask a fee-pooling arrangement if attorneys split fees
contractually. 49  In a pre-negotiated fee-sharing arrangement, counsels'
45 See infra Part III.B. for a discussion on how subgroup competition can benefit the
overall group through diverse ideas subject to certain conditions.
46 T.K. Ahn, R. Mark Isaac & Timothy C. Salmon, Endogenous Group Formation, 10 J.
PUB. EcON. THEORY 171, 190-91 (2008).
47 Burch, Litigating Groups, supra note 5, at 35-36.
48 See Coffee, supra note 6, at 397-98 (suggesting that it is not "realistic to expect ...
separate law firms to bargain on behalf of their separate subclasses over the settlements'
allocation when their own fees are pooled").
49 See id. at 398 (expressing concerns that "plaintiffs' attorneys for different subclasses
could by pooling their fees effectively cancel the incentives that the law means to create for
them to zealously represent their clients"). Not all courts enforce this kind of agreement.
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economic interests are tethered not to their clients but to one another. The
pressure is toward consensus, not vigorous representation.50
Table 1: Summary of the Moving Parts and Problems in Nonclass Aggregation
Claim Initial Post-Aggregation Settlement Offer
Initiation Aggregation
Basic Whether to litigate Whose interests How might To whom is it
Questions individually or does aggregation cooperation fair?
collectively? serve? among plaintiffs Does it satisfy
Is there a Has the impulse to further their plaintiffs' goals?
preexisting group? aggregate become goals? Is the proposed
What are plaintiffs' so automatic that Are there reasons allocation fair?
litigation goals? there is no longer that litigants might How should a
careful evaluation desire to remain group decide these
of the ends outside of the questions?
achieved? group?
Do group Perhaps, if the Perhaps, if the Group formation Yes, holdouts,
problems group predates the group predates the and cohesion outliers, and
exist? litigation. litigation. begins here if the subgroups all exist
group did not here.
predate litigation.
Do agency Depends on the Yes, aggregating Yes. Yes, particularly
problems number of similarly helps plaintiffs' prevalent in offers
exist? situated clients and attorneys recoup requiring
the timing of start-up costs. unanimous or
retention. If nearly unanimous
aggregation is done consent.
through attorneys,
then problems of
deciding which
claims to pursue
can exist.
Do Less likely. Less likely. Yes. Yes.
competition Competition Competition in
problems between plaintiffs' general is
exist? attorneys may be probably still
beneficial here. beneficial here.
See e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 216, 222 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding
that a consensual fee sharing arrangement between attorneys "places class counsel in a
potentially conflicting position in relation to the interests of the class").
so See Coffee, supra note 6, at 398.
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This Article focuses on the highlighted areas in the table above - problems
with the group dynamic arising between plaintiffs during the post-aggregation
and settlement stages. The idea is that litigating together, where plaintiffs
cooperate and coordinate with one another, will generate positive externalities
that also address the agency and competition problems that crop up throughout
the litigation. But litigating together is not as simple as it sounds. Consider,
for example, other coordination problems such as resource depletion and
pollution: in the winter, we are asked to lower our thermostats to conserve fuel;
as individuals, we suffer more from the cold without amassing our own fuel
supply. But if we all kept our thermostats high, we could run out of fuel and
freeze. Similarly, during summer ozone alerts, we are encouraged to car pool,
ride bicycles, or walk. Yet, we are individually worse off for bicycling or
walking in exhaust fumes and may find carpooling inconvenient.51 Social
dilemmas like these have two defining properties: (1) the payoff to each
individual for defecting rather than cooperating is greater, despite what other
people might do, but (2) everyone is better off if each cooperates than if all act
selfishly.52
Plaintiffs in mass litigation face similar coordination problems. For
example, when they discover that the defendant cannot afford to (or simply
will not) fully compensate each of them and has conditioned a settlement offer
on widespread acceptance, the payoff to the individual claimant for
withholding consent and demanding a premium is greater. And, assuming the
settlement is a fair one negotiated at arm's length, all plaintiffs are better off if
each cooperates than if one holds out. In short, the more litigants pursue their
private interest at the expense of the group's collective interest, the more the
group falls short of achieving its collective goals.
To date, institutional players have tinkered with this payoff structure
through carrots and sticks, which sounds attractive and simplistic until we
realize what is actually taking place. Consider again the Vioxx settlement.
Remember that each participating lawyer had to recommend the deal to 100%
of her eligible clients and withdraw from representing anyone who refused.53
1 These examples are based on similar examples by Robyn M. Dawes. See Robyn M.
Dawes, Social Dilemmas, 31 ANN. REv. PSYCHOL. 169, 170 (1980).
52 Id.; van Dijk & De Cremer, supra note 44, at 141 (observing that social dilemmas
result in "mixed-motive situations" in which individuals are better off if they pursue their
own interests, while the entire group is better off if individuals pursue group interests); see
also Michael Smithson & Margaret Foddy, Theories and Strategies for the Study of Social
Dilemmas, in RESOLVING SOCIAL DILEMMAS 1-2 (Margaret Foddy et al. eds., 1999) ("[T]he
reward or payoff to each individual for a selfish choice is higher than that for a cooperative
one, regardless of what other people do; yet all individuals in the group receive a lower
payoff if all defect than if all cooperate.").
1 Vioxx Settlement Agreement, supra note 1, § 1.2.8.1-2.
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The settlement required at least 85% of claimants to consent or risk crippling
the entire deal such that no one would get anything, including the plaintiffs'
attorneys. Without this kind of coercion, it might seem like the only
alternative is to deplete the common fund by paying off the would-be holdouts
at the group's expense. But as the remainder of this Article explains, this is not
the case; most people are moral and want to do what's right when they know
about the others involved - they do not always act as "homo economicus,"
purely economically motivated, self-interested individuals. 54
II. COMMUNAL ENCUMBRANCES OF LITIGATING TOGETHER
The problems in nonclass aggregation raise fundamental philosophical,
psychological, political, and behavioral questions about whether we are
destined to compete with one another for common goods or whether
collaboration, community, cooperation, and other-regarding preferences might
motivate us to work together. Thinking about these larger issues entails careful
parsing of three central questions: (1) why do people litigate in the first place,
(2) why should they want to litigate together, and (3) what obligations do they
owe one another when they do so?
Plaintiffs litigate for various, potentially incompatible reasons. For instance,
plaintiffs who want money might agree to a confidential settlement that would
thwart the goals of those hoping to educate the public or reveal cover-ups.
When asked, plaintiffs with tort claims such as medical injuries insist that they
litigate on principle, not for the money.55 As Tamara Relis describes the
results of her study, "[p]laintiffs' articulated litigation aims were largely
composed of extra-legal objectives of principle, with 41% not mentioning
monetary compensation at all, 35% saying it was of secondary importance,
18% describing money as their primary objective in suing, and only one person
(6%) saying it was money alone."56 Plaintiffs' extra-legal objectives included
wanting the defendant to admit fault and responsibility, ensuring that the event
would never happen again, revealing cover-ups, needing answers, wanting to
punish or gain retribution, seeking an apology, desiring dignity and respect
post-injury, and wanting to be heard.57 Similarly, studying the victims of the
54 See Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and
Cooperation, 114 Q.J. EcoN. 817, 818 (1999) ("Reality provides many examples indicating
that people are more cooperative than is assumed in the standard self-interest model.");
Mizuho Shinada & Toshio Yamagishi, Bringing Back Leviathan into Social Dilemmas, in
NEW ISSUES AND PARADIGMS IN RESEARCH ON SOCIAL DILEMMAS 93, 94 (Anders Biel et al.
eds., 2008).
5s Tamara Relis, "It's Not About the Money!": A Theory of Misconceptions of Plaintiffs'
Litigation Aims, 68 U. Pirr. L. REv. 701, 721 (2007).
16 Id. at 723 (emphasis omitted).
5 Id. at 723 fig.4. Other studies confirm these results. See, e.g., Marc Galanter,
Adjudication, Litigation, and Related Phenomena, in LAW AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 151,
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September 11 tragedy, Gillian Hadfield found that litigants wanted information
about the facts and circumstances, to hold those responsible accountable, to
have a public condemnation of wrongdoing, and to do something that would
promote change. 8 In short, litigation to them meant "principled participation
in a process that is constitutive of a community." 59
This answers the question about why people litigate, but not why they do or
should litigate together. Part I explained that some plaintiffs choose to litigate
together by seeking collective representation while others are foisted on one
another through administrative clustering. But once plaintiffs are procedurally
aggregated, whether by choice or not, why should they then cooperate? The
simple answer is that cooperation saves costs and increases plaintiffs'
bargaining power. But once plaintiffs are joined, they may not act in unison;
groups are fragile, particularly when collective action is required. Consider,
for instance, the parable of the deer and the rabbit, as Rousseau describes it:
When it came to tracking down a deer, everyone realized that he should
remain dependable at his post; but if a hare happened to pass within reach
of one of them, he undoubtedly would not have hesitated to run off after it
and, after catching his prey, he would have troubled himself little about
causing his companions to lose theirs.60
Here, all hunters would prefer to eat venison, but they have to work
cooperatively to kill a deer. Along the way, one might be tempted to defect
and chase a rabbit, which would undermine the group's collective efforts. Like
191 (Leon Lipson & Stanton Wheeler eds., 1986) ("Litigants vary in the extent to which
they seek justice or moral vindication instead of, or in addition to, a satisfactory resolution
of their immediate discomforts."); Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What
We Know and Don't Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and
Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REv. 4, 30-31 (1983); Gerald B. Hickson et al., Factors that
Prompted Families to File Medical Malpractice Claims Following Perinatal Injuries, 267
JAMA 1359, 1361 (1992) (finding that litigation motives included desire for money, to
reveal cover-ups, and to protect others); E. Allan Lind et al., In the Eye of the Beholder:
Tort Litigants' Evaluations of their Experiences in the Civil Justice System, 24 LAW &
Soc'y REV. 953, 983-86 (1990) (finding that litigants' satisfaction with the outcomes of their
claims was largely determined by the litigants' perceptions of procedural fairness and
expectations); Erin Ann O'Hara & Douglas Yarn, On Apology and Consilience, 77 WASH.
L. REV. 1121,1125 (2002).
58 Gillian K. Hadfield, Framing the Choice Between Cash and the Courthouse:
Experiences with the 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund, 42 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 645, 649, 660-
62 (2008).
59 Id. at 649.
60 JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, DISCOURSE ON THE ORIGIN OF INEQUALITY 57-58 (Franklin
Philip trans., Patrick Coleman ed. 1994) (1754). For a modern-day take on the stag hunt,
see BRIAN SKYRMS, THE STAG HUNT AND THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE 1-13 (2004)
("[T]he stag hunt does not solve the problem of cooperation. It allows cooperation in
equilibrium, but there is also the noncooperative equilibrium.").
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this stag hunt, plaintiffs litigating together might achieve a better result through
their increased bargaining power.
When people litigate together, they intend to engage in joint activity with
one another, the act of litigating.6' With that intention comes a host of roles
and social norms that coordinate, structure, and guide the litigants' activity.62
People litigating simultaneously (but not together) lack the roles and social
cues that might otherwise coordinate and direct their joint activity. 63 When the
defendant proposes a settlement, a cacophony of goals then emerges and
plaintiffs are more likely to object, dissent, or hold out.6 4 Plaintiffs might want
to pursue their own ends. Even seemingly compatible ends - to punish the
defendant, for instance - might result in disunity. Punishing a corporate
defendant financially might mean requesting punitive damages (a court-based
remedy) or boycotting its products (social and market-based sanctions). Or
punishing a defendant might mean forcing the defendant to admit fault or to
change its corporate or regulatory practices. But without further specifying the
end of punishment, deciding what to do and how to go about it will be too
indefinite to be of much use.
Take, for instance, a non-legal analogy. In the 1970s and 1980s, the French
government developed an idea for futuristic transportation, "Aramis."65 But
Aramis was many things to many people; its economic and technical feasibility
depended on what it was.66 At times, it was to be an airport shuttle, a
monorail, an urban network, a subway, a low-tech people mover, personalized
point-to-point transportation, or a commuter train.67 Without knowing what
Aramis was, the instrumentalist means-end reasoning (is it economically and
technically feasible?) failed.68 And ultimately Aramis failed.69 In many ways,
mass-tort litigation - with many unique plaintiffs articulating independent ends
about its purpose - is like Aramis.
Addressing and discussing litigants' ends early in the litigation, deciding
what to do and how to go about it, can remove conflict. By specifying their
61 See Michael E. Bratman, Modest Sociality and the Distinctiveness of Intention, 144
PHIL. STUD. 149, 152 (2009).
62 See id. at 154.
63 See id. at 153-54.
1 For an excellent treatment of this issue in the class action context, see Deborah L.
Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REv. 1183, 1188-89 (1982).
65 See BRUNO LATOUR, ARAMIS, OR THE LOVE OF TECHNOLOGY ix-x (Catherine Porter
trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1996); Elijah Millgram, Specificationism, in REASONING:
STUDIES OF HUMAN INFERENCE AND ITS FOUNDATIONS 731, 731 (Jonathan E. Adler & Lance
J. Rips eds., 2008).
66 Millgram, supra note 65, at 743.
67 Id. at 731-35.
68 Id. at 735.
69 Id. at 734.
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ends together through practical reasoning, litigants may make those ends
jointly achievable, introduce commensurability, and ease friction.70
Alternatively, discussing goals could introduce conflict. Encouraging
plaintiffs to think about, articulate, and specify ends may aggravate matters
that might otherwise be non-issues. But even exhuming conflict has its
benefits. It may lead, for instance, to alternative representation or sharpened
legal arguments.
What then makes plaintiffs a group such that they incur moral
responsibilities to one another? To be sure, plaintiffs do not form a group
simply by filing nominally related claims against the same defendant. Rather,
it is litigants' voluntary commitments and intentions concerning a shared
endeavor that form the basis for group membership. In general, people form a
relational community around a common history or interest and the group's
members have a unified purpose, are connected and committed to one another,
and rely on common norms to guide their behavior.71 Litigating Groups
captured the spectrum of group cohesion by using the flexible, umbrella term
"plural subject."72 Simply put, a plural subject is an instance where multiple
individuals - several "I's" - become a single, plural subject - a "we." 73 As an
umbrella term, what makes plaintiffs a plural subject can vary greatly: litigants
might knowingly share similar desires, interests, intentions, goals, or
commitments concerning the litigation; they might collectively participate in a
litigation-related activity; or they might design a group policy concerning the
litigation.74
To capture when and how plural subjects incur associative, moral
obligations to the group I posited two cases, the first of which was too vague in
important ways.75 It provided that when multiple litigants each intend to do
something litigation-related, they are obligated to conduct that activity
together.76 The problem here is that plaintiffs litigating against the same
defendant may have only that abstract intention in common; they may not
70 See id. at 735.
71 See R. Scott Tindale et al., Shared Cognition in Small Groups, in BLACKWELL
HANDBOOK ON SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: GROUP PROCESSES 5 (Michael A. Hogg & R. Scott
Tindale eds., 2001); Community, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.meriam-
webster.com/dictionary/community (last visited Nov. 14, 2010).
72 Litigating Groups, supra note 5, at 23-26. I borrow this term from Margaret Gilbert,
but do not use it in exactly the same way that she does. MARGARET GILBERT, SOCIALITY
AND RESPONSIBILITY: NEW ESSAYS IN PLURAL SUBJECT THEORY 2-3 (2000) ("People form a
plural subject, in my sense, when they are jointly committed to doing something as a body,
in a broad sense of 'do."').
7 Litigating Groups, supra note 5, at 23-26.
74 Id. at 24.
75 Id. at 43-47.
76 Id. at 43-45.
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intend to litigate together at all.77 Accounting for this shortcoming, the second
case posited that once litigants voluntarily intend to do something litigation
related and commit to doing that activity together through promises or
assurances, they are obligated to fulfill that commitment so long as there are no
exit conditions to the contrary. 78
Commitments may take many forms - tacit agreements, a series of
reciprocal exchanges, explicit or implicit promises or assurances, or legal
contracts. By jointly and voluntarily intending to do something litigation
related ("X") together, litigants will function in ways that promote and further
that intention. 79 Of course, intending to "X" together might be just one
litigation component, such as conducting discovery together, and may not
extend to other litigation-related activities.80 Yet, sharing intentions on some
points frequently leads litigants to conform to a norm of compatibility and
collaborate on other, related activities. There is thus some resistance to
reconsideration and change.
Although I have described why people litigate, why they might want to
litigate together, and what makes plaintiffs group members who might incur
obligations to one another, I have said little about the content or origin of those
obligations. It is beyond this Article's scope to argue in detail about the origin
or existence of communal obligations. Instead, I offer two sources for these
obligations - one moral, one legal - and note that the obligations' actual
content largely depends on the group itself.81 First, I introduce some threads of
political theory, particularly the communitarian critique of liberalism, which
explain moral obligations in nonclass aggregation in a way that mere welfare
maximization or individual autonomy cannot.82  Even though the term
"communitarian" is convenient shorthand for some of the ideas I find
important, it risks opening the door to a host of implications that have little to
do with the relatively narrow points that I make here. Nevertheless, I find the
term useful enough to depend on with that caveat in place. Second, I use class-
n Id. at 43.
78 Id. at 45-47.
7 Id.
80 Id
81 For further reading and debate on the nature, existence, and scope of these obligations,
see WILL KYMLICKA, LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY, AND CULTURE (1989); ALASDAIR
MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY (3rd ed., Univ. of Notre Dame
Press 2007) (1981) (describing the moral culture of modernity through the concept of
virtues); MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (2d ed. 1998);
MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY (1983).
82 For a more detailed account of moral and political theory, see Elizabeth Chamblee
Burch, Aggregation, Community, and the Line Between, 58 U. KANSAS L. REv. 889, 904-15
(2010).
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action analogies to set forth a legal justification for binding nonclass plaintiffs
when group cohesion truly exists.
In terms of moral and political philosophy, plaintiffs' voluntary
commitments and decisions to associate with one another loosely preserve the
fundamental tenets of self-determination and consent in liberal theory.83 One
might claim that this attribute makes these groups purely contractarian, but an
exclusively liberal view ignores the complex psychological and social
dynamics of groups as well as the transformative nature of social relationships.
As a liberal account might explain it, if five plaintiffs promise to cooperate but
each has very different ideas about what that means, then that disunity
undermines either their initial consent or their subsequent obligation to fulfill
that promise. But if, by associating and being in community with one another,
plaintiffs incur additional obligations of solidarity or membership, then there is
a thicker obligation that cannot be discounted so easily. 84
It is here that communitarianism plays a limited role. Once plaintiffs
voluntarily associate with one another and commit to cooperate, the power of
self-determination rests with the collective in a way that carries out members'
communal interests and values, their obligations of solidarity. As Alasdair
MacIntyre contends, we can answer the question, "What am I to do?" only if
we can "answer the prior question 'Of what story or stories do I find myself a
part?" 85 In this way, communitarians challenge the liberal idea that we freely
choose all of our obligations; instead, we incur certain communal
encumbrances through our membership in particular communities.86
Specifically, plaintiffs' individual circumstances are part of a larger, collective
narrative: they do not choose to be injured, but when the same drug or product
injures them and many others in similar ways, it changes the course of their
lives, changes their life stories, and ties them together in ways that no one
would ever choose. Yet, these shared experiences bring them together through
litigation. As Michael Sandel explains, "obligations of solidarity or
membership may claim us for reasons unrelated to a choice - reasons bound up
with the narratives by which we interpret our lives and the communities we
inhabit." 87
83 See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 108-17 (1971) (explaining that obligations can
arise through natural duties and voluntary acts, such as promises and agreements).
84 MICHAEL J. SANDEL, JUSTICE: WHAT'S THE RIGHT THING TO Do? 225 (2009)
("[O]bligations of solidarity, or membership . . . involve moral responsibilities we owe, not
to rational beings as such, but to those with whom we share a certain history.").
81 MACINTYRE, supra note 81, at 216.
86 See id.; SANDEL, supra note 84, at 223-25 (describing the deficiencies of the liberal
theory in accounting for obligations of solidarity); WALZER, supra note 81, at 62.
87 SANDEL, supra note 84, at 241; see also RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 195-202
(1986) ("[I]t is a history of events and acts that attract obligations, and we are rarely even
aware that we are entering upon any special status as the story unfolds.").
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The drawback from a liberal perspective is that litigants are not free to exit
the group if doing so would violate their obligations of solidarity and loyalty.
Conversely, the disjunction with communitarianism is that these obligations of
solidarity arise only after plaintiffs have defined the membership by
associating voluntarily. Thus, associative obligations can be captured, at least
initially, through an ethic of consent.88 Admittedly, as the latter half of this
Article explores, these moral obligations do not translate easily into legal
obligations.
Drawing class-action analogies does, however, bring us closer to a legal
source for justifying the existence of communal obligations. As Steve Yeazell
explains, the modem-day class action evolved from medieval guilds where all
community members shared in the obligations, duties, and benefits of
villeinage membership. 89 Group responsibility was a matter of fact, a custom
without further explanation.90 Yet, modem-day theorists, situated in a system
founded on individual rights, feel compelled to explain it. David Rosenberg,
for example, argues that litigants behind a Rawlsian veil of ignorance would
agree ex ante to tie their fates together and preserve their collective welfare
rather than incentivizing individuals to maximize their own tort gains at others'
expense.91 Still, tort claims and the decision to sue at all are individually held
rights. As Richard Nagareda reminds us, litigants "have a preexisting right to
maximize their own individual gains" and these gains are independent. 92
To justify collective (sometimes mandatory) treatment of present-day class
members, modem courts presume group cohesion. It is the same idea from
medieval times that used to go without saying. But class-action attorneys -
ranging from those bringing employment-discrimination claims to civil-rights
actions to securities-fraud allegations - explicitly invoke a presumption of
cohesion to justify using aggregate proof and to bind those within the class.93
In the securities-fraud context, for instance, some courts permit a cohesive
group of unrelated investors to serve as lead plaintiff if it best serves the class's
18 SANDEL, supra note 84, at 241 ("We've been trying to figure out whether all our duties
and obligations can be traced to an act of will or choice. I've argued that they cannot;
obligations of solidarity or membership may claim us for reasons unrelated to a choice -
reasons bound up with the narratives by which we interpret our lives and the communities
we inhabit.").
89 STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS
ACTION 42-52 (1987).
90 Id. at 270-71.
91 Rosenberg, supra note 11, at 832.
92 NAGAREDA, supra note 9, at 119.
93 See Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84
N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 103-04 (2009) ("The implication invited by class counsel is that only by
taking an aggregate, class-wide perspective does the wrong allegedly committed by the
defendant come into focus.").
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interest. 94 To evaluate cohesiveness, these courts examine factors such as: "(1)
the existence of a pre-litigation relationship between group members; (2)
involvement of the group members in the litigation thus far; (3) plans for
cooperation; (4) the sophistication of its members; and (5) whether the
members chose outside counsel, and not vice versa."95 Following these
factors, courts have declined to appoint ad hoc groups that "coalesce" as the
result of an eleventh-hour, lawyer-driven arrangement in favor of those who
demonstrate an actual ability and desire to work together.96
Presumed cohesion likewise explains Rule 23(b)(2) mandatory class actions.
In these classes, judges determine whether the defendant has "acted or refused
to act on grounds that apply generally to the class" such that the relief is
appropriate for "the class as a whole." 97 This language has led several courts
and commentators to assume that if this is true, then actual group cohesion
exists.98 For example, the Fifth Circuit concluded that because of "the group
nature of the harm alleged and the broad character of the relief sought," the
Rule 23(b)(2) "class is, by its very nature, assumed to be a homogenous and
94 See, e.g., In re McDermott Int'l, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 08 Civ. 9943(DC), 2009 WL
579502, at *2-5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2009) (appointing family members as lead plaintiffs and
not requiring them to proffer an evidentiary showing because they were presumably
cohesive); Varghese v. China Shenghuo Pharm. Holdings, Inc., 589 F. Supp. 2d 388, 392
(S.D.N.Y. 2008); Freudenberg v. E*Trade Fin. Corp., Nos. 07 Civ. 8538, 07 Civ. 8808, 07
Civ. 9651, 07 Civ. 10400, 07 Civ. 10540, 2008 WL 2876373, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 16,
2008); Reimer v. Ambac Fin. Group, Inc., No. 08 Civ. 411, 2008 WL 2073931, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. May 9, 2008); In re Nature's Sunshine Prods., Inc., No. 2:06-CV-267 TS, 2006
WL 2380965, at *1 (D. Utah Aug. 16, 2006) (appointing a group as lead plaintiff based on
affidavits demonstrating their cooperative efforts); In re Star Gas Sec. Litig., No.
3:04CV1766, 2005 WL 818617, at *4-5 (D. Conn. Apr. 8, 2005); Constance Sczesny Trust
v. KPMG LLP, 223 F.R.D. 319, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
* Varghese, 589 F. Supp. 2d at 392.
96 See McDermott Int'l, 2009 WL 579502, at *2-5; Varghese, 589 F. Supp. 2d at 394. In
Varghese, the court notes that the PLSLRA demonstrates a concern for lawyer-driven
coalitions. Id. at 392.
97 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
98 See, e.g., Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 413 (5th Cir. 1998) ("In
contrast, because of the group nature of harm alleged and the broad character of relief
sought, the (b)(2) class is, by its very nature, assumed to be a homogenous and cohesive
group with few conflicting interests among its members."); Holmes v. Cont'l Can Co., 706
F.2d 1144, 1155 n.8, 1156-57 (11th Cir. 1983) ("At base, the (b)(2) class is distinguished
from the (b)(3) class by class cohesiveness." (citation omitted)); Penson v. Terminal Transp.
Co., 634 F.2d 989, 993-94 (5th Cir. 1981); Johnson v. Gen. Motors Corp., 598 F.2d 432,
437-38 (5th Cir. 1979); Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 256 (3d Cir. 1975);
see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee note, reprinted in 39 F.R.D. 69, 106 (1966)
("In the degree that there is cohesiveness or unity in the class and the representation is
effective the need for notice to the class will tend toward a minimum.").
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cohesive group with few conflicting interests among its members." 99
Likewise, the Third Circuit observes, "[t]he very nature of a (b)(2) class is that
it is homogeneous without any conflicting interests between the members of
the class."100
Naturally, this cohesion is often a convenient fiction. One need not delve
too deeply to find fundamental disagreement over everything from the desired
relief to the initial decision to sue.10 For instance, in Walters v. Barry,102 a
case involving a Rule 23(b)(2) class, residents sued the District of Columbia
and alleged that implementing a nighttime juvenile curfew violated their First,
Fourth, and Fifth Amendment rights. 03 The court certified the class despite
members' vastly divergent opinions about whether keeping the curfew was a
good idea.104
Presuming that actual group cohesion exists in the Rule 23(b)(2) context
prevents the instabilities, opt-outs, and holdouts that make the collective good
tough to achieve in Rule 23(b)(3)'s opt-out class actions. 05 The important
point for our purposes, however, is that if group cohesion in nonclass
aggregation is real, regardless of whether it predates or postdates the decision
to sue, then there is ample legal justification for limiting plaintiffs' freedom to
pursue their claims individually. 06 That is, when litigants form cohesive
groups with communal bonds - when they litigate together, in other words -
then it makes sense both morally and legally to allow them to collectively bind
their litigation fates.
III. A COOPERATIVE LITIGATION MODEL
Discussing why people litigate, why they might find litigating together
beneficial, and how they incur associative obligations encourages a shift in
normative thought from a pure welfare-maximizing or individual-justice
9 Allison, 151 F.3d at 413. The Eleventh Circuit similarly relied on a presumption of
cohesion for 23(b)(2) groups. Holmes, 706 F.2d at 1155-56.
'oo Wetzel, 508 F.2d at 256.
1o1 See Rhode, supra note 64, at 1215-16.
102 711 F. Supp. 1125 (D.D.C. 1989).
103 Id. at 1130-32.
' Id. at 1131 ("[D]ifferences of opinion are unavoidable [but] diversity of opinion
within a class does not defeat class certification.").
105 I thank David Marcus for this point.
106 See, e.g., Holmes v. Cont'l Can Co., 706 F.2d 1144, 1156 n.9 (11th Cir. 1983)
("There will be situations where the class is cohesive, or where the legal relationship of the
members enable one or more to stand in judgment for all, and where the representatives are
truly representative and faithful - a most important factor." (citation omitted)); Burch, supra
note 82, at 903 (reasoning that, because the 'presumed cohesion' of class action judgments
binds absent litigants, cohesion in nonclass aggregate claims warrants limiting plaintiffs'
ability to pursue their own claims).
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perspective to one that values intra-group relationships, commitments, and
joint ends. Rather than adopting the familiar means-end, instrumental view of
aggregating - that aggregating is a means to attain one's private goals or ends
- one might claim that aggregating allows plaintiffs to reason together about
the right thing to do and pursue their communal values and goals together. As
such, aggregating serves as a vehicle for litigants to specify and flesh out their
abstract ends, to harness the moral force of commitments, to further communal
interests, and ultimately to promote justice.
This process, not incidentally, has other positive spillovers that mitigate
agency and group problems. For instance, a plaintiff group that has
deliberated, specified, and settled on a particular end is in a better position to
make key decisions about the litigation's progress, to enumerate the best path
for achieving that end, and to monitor the attorneys. But plaintiffs, like all
actors engaged in a collective endeavor, face coordination problems. Thus, the
following sections develop methods for overcoming those problems. By
beginning with the basics - simple procedural tools such as using special
officers and promoting communication between plaintiffs - the first section
lays the groundwork. The second and third sections then use this groundwork
to deconstruct and resolve problems with sorting nominally related plaintiffs
into more cohesive groups, devise models for intra-plaintiff governance, and
propose methods for reducing those governance schemes into contractual
arrangements or social norms. The final section addresses potential obstacles
and contemplates the use of incentives for outliers, sanctions for holdouts, and
exit as a signaling function and safety valve when the social glue keeping
plaintiffs together loses its stickiness.
A. Rules and Tools
Given the opportunity to communicate, socialize, and form bonds with each
other, plaintiffs will tend to act in the group's best interest even absent heavy
doses of external coercion. Several variables promote sociality, including: (1)
allowing people to speak with one another; (2) promoting group identity; (3)
explaining the benefits of cooperation (i.e., the group loss that would result
from a self-interested strategy); (4) relying on instructions from a democratic-
style leader; and (5) determining whether plaintiffs believe that other plaintiffs
will cooperate. 0 7  This section explores how judges can integrate these
variables into mass litigation to promote cooperation. It explains two basic
ideas in more detail. First, judges should appoint a special officer on the
plaintiffs' side only to help sort a splintered superordinate group (comprised of
all plaintiffs) into more cohesive subgroups, mediate between feuding
subgroups when appropriate, and guide plaintiffs in implementing deliberative
107 Ostrom, supra note 14, at 140; Stout, supra note 14, at 22-23.
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democracy ideals - bargaining, arguing, and voting. Second, special officers
should facilitate communication and deliberation among plaintiffs.
1. Special Officer
Special officers are similar to, but distinct from, special masters.108 By
"special officer," I rely on the American Law Institute's definition, which
describes a person "whose function is to review issues from the perspective of
the class," but import it into nonclass aggregation.109 The same authority that
permits judges to appoint special masters - Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
Rule 53, Federal Rule of Evidence 706, and judges' inherent equitable
authority - also allows judges to hire special officers.I10 For example, under
Rule 53, a special master may handle pretrial matters that a district or
magistrate judge cannot timely or efficiently address; most pretrial matters in
mass litigation easily fit this bill."'
Ideally, judges should appoint a special officer soon after aggregating to
perform five key functions:
108 A "special master" is someone who serves "as a neutral advisor to the court regarding
the fairness of settlement and the adequacy of representation." PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
AGGREGATE LITIG., supra note 20, § 3.09(a)(2). Judge Weinstein often calls special masters
"settlement masters" to convey their role in settling the dispute. See, e.g., In re N.Y. Cnty.
DES Litig., 142 F.R.D. 58, 60 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) ("The powers of Settlement Master and
Referee are for relevant purposes equivalent."); In re Joint E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig.,
737 F. Supp. 735, 738-39 (E. & S. D.N.Y. 1990) (describing the obligation of settlement
masters to have frank and confidential discussions with all plaintiffs).
109 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG., supra note 20, § 3.09(a)(1), (2).
no As for judges' inherent equitable authority, see, for example, Ex parte Peterson, 253
U.S. 300, 312 (1920) ("Courts have (at least in the absence of legislation to the contrary)
inherent power to provide themselves with appropriate instruments required for the
performance of their duties . . .. [including] authority to appoint persons unconnected with
the court to aid judges in the performance of specific judicial duties . . . ." (citation
omitted)); In re DES Cases, 789 F. Supp. 552, 559 (E.D.N.Y. 1992); In re Joint E. & S.
Dists. Asbestos Litig., 737 F. Supp. At 737; In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F.
Supp. 1396, 1450 (E.D.N.Y. 1985); see also JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN
MASS TORT LITIGATION 145 (1995) (asserting that courts define the functions of special
masters expansively according to courts' traditional equitable authority); MANUAL FOR
COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH), supra note 24, § 21.632 (discussing the power of judges to
appoint special masters in order to review the settlement's terms and ensure fairness); Jack
B. Weinstein & Eileen B. Hershenov, The Effect of Equity on Mass Tort Law, 1991 U. ILL.
L. REV. 269, 302 (1991) (discussing the expansion of the role of special master based on a
liberal reading of Rule 53 and courts' equitable tradition). Using special masters is a long
historical tradition that arose in the English Chancery. Linda J. Silberman, Masters and
Magistrates Part II: The American Analogue, 50 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1297, 1321-22 (1975)
("The special master ... grew out of early English chancery practice: it was not derived
from the later system of masters at law who render pretrial assistance in civil matters.").
'" FED. R. Clv. P. 53(a)(1)(C).
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(1) help claimants specify, clarify, and prioritize their ends and values;
(2) determine which ends, claims, and injuries are commensurate;
(3) use that information to gauge whether to subgroup or disaggregate
some plaintiffs to ensure adequate representation;
(4) encourage problem-solving and collective decision-making about
litigation strategy (perhaps through designing a collective
governance agreement); and
(5) eventually review settlement offers to provide an independent
opinion about whether its terms and any subsequent allocation plan
are substantively fair and reasonable.' 12
Because plaintiffs frequently lack knowledge about their behavior's
externalities, their claims' strengths and weaknesses, and legal barriers to
settlement, receiving feedback from the special officer and talking with one
another helps plaintiffs act with increased rationality, develop alternatives, plan
strategies, and monitor the litigation.
Using a special officer in this way is not entirely foreign. For example, in
the Holocaust Victims' Assets Litigation, Judge Korman appointed a special
master to propose an allocation plan.113 As Lead Settlement Counsel Burt
Neubome explained it, that decision:
was motivated by a desire to spare Holocaust survivors from being forced
into an adversarial relationship that would have required them to squabble
over a settlement fund. . . . It was hoped that a neutral Special Master,
acting with the guidance of the affected community, could conduct a
serious inquiry into the facts and law, and propose a plan of allocation
and distribution that would do non-adversarial justice to the claims of all
class members. 114
In class actions, courts stress mediation's importance and appoint guardians ad
litem to investigate the settlement's fairness. 15 But unlike a guardian ad litem,
112 See CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, THE POLICY-MAKING PROCESS 13 (1968) (presenting a
model for rational decision-making). If plaintiffs' counsel is initially uncooperative, the
judge might endow the special officer with access to discovery tools. PRINCIPLES OF THE
LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG., supra note 20, § 3.09 cmt. (a)(1). Of course, the actual charge
that the judge gives the special officer will vary depending on the litigation's circumstances,
and this flexibility is necessary to allow the judge to tailor the procedures to the unique
aspects of each case.
" In re Holocaust Victims Assets Litig., 424 F.3d 132, 137 (2d Cir. 2005).
114 Id.
"s See, e.g., In re Asbestos Litig., 90 F.3d 963, 972 (5th Cir. 1996), vacated and
remanded on other grounds sub nom. Amchem Prods., Inc., 521 U.S. 591 (1997) (vacating
on Rule 23 grounds), affd on remand, 134 F.3d 668 (5th Cir. 1998) (affirming the earlier
disposition and finding that the requirements of class certification were met), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999) (reversing based on Rule
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who paternalistically represents a child's best interests, 1 6 or a mediator, who
resolves disputes between plaintiffs and defendants, the special officer that I
envision has a fiduciary obligation to plaintiffs and thus acts as a go-between,
mediator, and facilitator only on the plaintiffs' side." 7 This entails frank and
confidential discussions that neither the defendant nor the court is privy to." 8
Two clarifying points are in order. First, I am not suggesting that judges or
special officers replace a plaintiffs individually chosen lawyer or change the
attorneys' compensation terms. The special officer functions alongside
plaintiffs' chosen counsel to monitor counsel, identify circumstances in which
counsel is unable to represent all of her clients' interests, and aid in sorting
plaintiffs with diverse ends, claims, and injuries into more cohesive groups.'l 9
It stands to reason, however, that there is some cause for concern if an attorney
represents plaintiffs across a range of disparate subgroups. Significant
differences among subgroup interests may strain the attorney's loyalty and
require informed consent or alternative counsel. Second, special officers
should be part and parcel of a comprehensive judicial adjudication plan. By
23 class certification requirements); see also Susan P. Koniak, Feasting While the Widow
Weeps: Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc., 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1045, 1092 (1995)
(arguing that, ordinarily, a guardian would be required to protect the interests of unknowing
plaintiffs); William B. Rubenstein, The Fairness Hearing: Adversarial and Regulatory
Approaches, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1435, 1451 (2006) ("In other situations, courts have
appointed guardians for class members at the moment of settlement to consider the value of
the settlement to the class or some subset thereof ").
116 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 774 (8th ed. 2004) (categorizing "guardian ad litem" as a
subset of guardians).
117 See Kenneth R. Feinberg, How Can ADR Alleviate Long-Standing Social Problems?,
34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 785, 789-91 (2007). A longstanding debate exists between mediation
purists and mediation pluralists. See James J. Alfini, Evaluative Versus Facilitative
Mediation: A Discussion, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 919, 919 (1997); Chris Guthrie, The
Lawyer's Philosophical Map and the Disputant's Perceptual Map: Impediments to
Facilitative Mediation and Lawyering, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 145, 146-48 (2001). I adopt
the pluralistic approach, which acknowledges that mediators both facilitate communication
and evaluate the case itself. See Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding Mediators'
Orientations, Strategies, and Techniques: A Grid for the Perplexed, 1 HARV. NEGOT. L.
REv. 7, 17 (1996).
' See In re Joint E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 737 F. Supp. 735, 738-39 (E. & S.
D.N.Y. 1990). The common-interest privilege preserves client confidentiality. See Mitchell
A. Lowenthal & Howard M. Erichson, Modern Mass Tort Litigation, Prior-Action
Depositions and Practice-Sensitive Procedure, 63 FORDHAM L. REv. 989, 1001 (1995)
("Within the plaintiffs' network, the attorneys claim a 'common interest privilege' to protect
confidential communications among the various plaintiffs' counsel in mass tort litigation.").
"9 I discuss this process in more detail in Part III.B.
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working on the plaintiffs' side only, the special officer maintains litigants'
preference for adversarial litigation.120
Two potential downsides to using special officers include their cost and the
risk of the judge appearing partial to the plaintiffs. As to cost, people with the
experience, legal knowledge, skill, creativity, and artistry to act as special
officers - such as Ken Feinberg, Francis McGovern, and Burt Neuborne - are
expensive. The three "settlement masters" in the Agent Orange litigation, for
example, cost hundreds of thousands of dollars. 121 But expense is relative and
mass-tort litigation is a significant investment. 122 As compared with our
current system, where aggregating theoretically minimizes duplication, the cost
structure must take into account collateral attacks, payoffs to holdouts,
potentially inadequate representation, and the resulting ebb of judicial
legitimacy. Thus, overall, special officers seem worth the cost.
As to the judge appearing partial to the plaintiffs by appointing someone to
help organize them, it is a risk. Yet, judges regularly appoint special masters
in class-action litigation to ensure that the settlement is fair to class members
for precisely the same reason - concern that agency problems and conflicts of
interest will thwart adequate representation. 123 These agency risks prompted
Judge Posner to claim that the judge has a fiduciary duty to the class during
settlement.124  Similar appointments and associated risks in class actions
diminish the appearance of judicial partiality in nonclass aggregation. Further,
appointing a special officer levels the playing field by reducing the defendant's
120 Procedural Justice, supra note 25, at 29-31; see also JOHN THIBAULT & LAURENS
WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 104 (1975) (finding that
subjects under various conditions all expressed a preference for adversary procedure);
Pauline Houlden et al., Preference for Modes of Dispute Resolution as a Function of
Process and Decision Control, 14 J. ExP. SOC. PSYCHOL. 13, 29 (1978) (reporting that an
adversarial procedure is preferred because it provides for a "full presentation of all issues
relevant to a particular dispute").
121 Peter H. Schuck, The Role of Judges in Settling Complex Cases: The Agent Orange
Example, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 337,348 (1986).
122 See infra notes 255-257 and accompanying text (estimating that the initial Vioxx
cases cost around $1.5 million to develop).
123 See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG., supra note 20, at §§ 3.02 cmt. a,
3.05 cmt. b, 3.09; MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH), supra note 24, at § 21.632.
As the American Law Institute recommends, the court may appoint a special officer, a
guardian ad litem, a neutral or special master, or even its own expert to analyze the
settlement's fairness. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG., supra note 20, at §
3.09.
124 Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat'l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 279-80 (7th Cir. 2002); see also
Chris Brummer, Note, Sharpening the Sword: Class Certification, Appellate Review, and
the Role of the Fiduciary Judge in Class Action Lawsuits, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1042, 1060-
61(2004).
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ability to capitalize strategically on plaintiffs as uninformed, poor case
monitors.
2. Communication
Special officers can also help foster plaintiff communication. Not
surprisingly, numerous studies show that giving people the opportunity to
interact positively influences their willingness to cooperate and their fairness
perceptions. 125 Cooperating after communicating also illustrates the behavioral
response to moral obligations of solidarity. Researchers have various theories
about why this is: maybe discussion gives individuals more information about
their choices, allows them to make explicit and implicit commitments to each
other, or fosters a sense of group identity and community. 126 For instance,
allowing group members to talk with each other leads many to mutually
obligate themselves to cooperate and to predict - at rates significantly better
than chance alone - whether others will also behave cooperatively. 127 The
125 See, e.g., Wim B. G. Liebrand, The Effect of Social Motives, Communication and
Group Size on Behavior in an N-Person Multi-Stage Mixed-Motive Game, 14 EUR. J. Soc.
PSYCHOL. 239, 239 (1984); L. Musante et al., The Effects of Control on Perceived Fairness
ofProcedures and Outcomes, 19 J. EXP. Soc. PSYCHOL. 223, 237-38 (1983); J. Orbell et al.,
The Limits ofMultilateral Promising, 100 ETHICS 616,627 (1990); Ostrom, supra note 14, at
140; see also Elinor Ostrom & James Walker, Neither Markets Nor States: Linking
Transformation Processes in Collective Action Arenas, in PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC CHOICE:
A HANDBOOK 62 (Dennis C. Mueller ed., 1997) (reporting that when individuals are given
the opportunity to interact, they adopt cooperative strategies that positively influence the
outcome in many settings).
Irving Janis's now classic text, Groupthink, raises questions about the efficacy of what I
am proposing. IRVING L. JANIS, VICTIMS OF GROUPTHINK 8-9 (1972) (discussing the
detrimental effects of group cohesiveness on the decision-making process). Although his
take still predominates popular notions about groups and remains compelling, research in
the years since his publication has generated skepticism. See Robert S. Baron, So Right It's
Wrong: Groupthink and the Ubiquitous Nature of Polarized Group Decision Making, in 37
ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 219, 245-47 (Mark P. Zanna ed., 2005)
("A review of the research and debate regarding Janis's groupthink model leads to the
conclusion that after some 30 years of investigation, the evidence has largely failed to
support the formulation's more ambitious and controversial predictions, specifically those
linking certain antecedent conditions with groupthink phenomena."); Norbert L. Kerr & R.
Scott Tinsdale, Group Performance and Decision Making, 55 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 623, 640
(2004). My proposal for including dissenting viewpoints further diminishes this risk.
126 Peter Kollock, Social Dilemmas: The Anatomy of Cooperation, 24 ANN. REV. SOCIOL.
183, 194 (1998); David M. Messick & Marilynn B. Brewer, Solving Social Dilemmas: A
Review, in 4 REVIEW OF PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 11, 27 (L. Wheeler & P.
Shaver eds., 1983) ("[C]ooperative solutions to social dilemmas may be facilitated by
exploiting the constructive social ties and affiliative bonds arising from social group
identity.").
127 See Robert H. Frank et al., The Evolution of One-Shot Cooperation: An Experiment,
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more plaintiffs use a reciprocal strategy - "I'll cooperate if everyone else does
too" - the more they follow through with their commitments. 128 Other studies
demonstrate that individuals cooperate when they feel like they are part of a
group. 129 We need not resolve this larger question about why people cooperate
here since the key to each theory and, thus, to cooperative litigation, is plaintiff
interaction.
Rules 16 and 26(f) already authorize the judge to promote dialogue among
plaintiffs. Rule 16 requires pretrial conferences to discourage "wasteful
pretrial activities" and to improve "the quality of the trial through more
thorough preparation."130 To further these aims, the court may order parties or
their representatives to attend pretrial conferences or be available by other
means.131 Similarly, Rule 26(f) requires conferences about discovery and
collaboration on discovery plans.132  Plus, judges regularly invoke their
inherent equitable authority to manage mass litigation, and encouraging
communication - like appointing a special officer - is well within that
authority. 133
Communication among plaintiffs may yield a variety of benefits. It could
create opportunities for social interactions, lead plaintiffs to share privately
held information, encourage participants to justify their claims and ends,
produce creative solutions, decrease the impact of bounded rationality, enhance
deliberative democracy, and increase legitimacy.134  Plaintiffs may use
communication opportunities to devise a joint strategy, elicit promises to
cooperate, and verbally sanction or encourage others.'35  Like negative
advertising campaigns, plaintiffs have little incentive to emphasize the
drawbacks of their own proposals, but those who disagree willingly expose
those flaws, which may lead to a better or fairer outcome.136 Moreover, giving
14 ETHOLOGY & SOCIOBIOLOGY 247, 255 (1993) (finding that predictions based on chance
were more than seven percent less accurate than those made by communicative groups);
Norbert L. Kerr & Cynthia M. Kaufman-Gilliland, Communication, Commitment, and
Cooperation in Social Dilemmas, 66 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 513, 525-26 (1994).
128 S.S. Komorita et al., Reciprocity and the Induction of Cooperation in Social
Dilemmas, 62 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 607, 614-15 (1992).
129 See, e.g., Robin Dawes, Social Dilemmas, Economic Self-Interest, and Evolutionary
Theory, in FRONTIERS OF MATHEMATICAL PSYCHOLOGY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF CLYDE
COOMBS 53, 62 (Donald R. Brown & J.E. Keith Smith eds., 1991).
130 FED. R. Civ. P. 16(a).
13' Id.
132 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f).
133 See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG. supra note 20, § 1.05 cmt. c.
134 See James D. Fearon, Deliberation as Discussion, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 44,
45 (Jon Elster ed. 1998).
135 Ostrom, supra note 14, at 140.
136 Jon Elster, Introduction to DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 1, 12 (Jon Elster ed., 1998).
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litigants a chance to consider their ends collaboratively may change, sharpen,
and specify those ends in ways that mere procedural aggregation cannot. To
borrow the words of Frank Michelman, the goal is to resolve normative
plaintiffs'-side disputes "by conversation ... and intelligible reason-giving, as
opposed to self-justifying impulse and ipse dixit."l 37
Accordingly, it would be more convenient to claim that plaintiffs benefit
equally from telephone or Internet conversations and that interacting face-to-
face is an outdated relic of the past. And there are a few studies on on-line
communities such as MySpace and LiveJournal that demonstrate how these
networks constitute cohesive groups and others that show no appreciable
difference between computer-mediated communication and face-to-face
interaction. 138 But still other studies indicate what seems intuitively correct -
that there is something humanizing and thus more compelling about face-to-
face interactions. 13 9 Consider, for instance, whether you would be more likely
to buy cookies from a neighborhood Girl Scout at your front door or magazines
from a telemarketer. I suspect that many of us would hang up on telemarketers
and stockpile boxes of Thin Mints and Samoas. Face-to-face personal
exchanges impart social cues - guilt, approval, and reciprocity - that other
media lack. 140 Of course, once we meet each other, we tend to cultivate and
maintain those relationships through other media such as e-mail, telephone
calls, instant messaging, text messaging, Skype, Twitter, and Facebook.14 1
137 Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term - Forward: Traces of Self-
Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 34 (1986).
131 See Kelly Bouas Henry, Perceptions of Cooperation in a Longitudinal Social
Dilemma, 31 SMALL GRP. RES. 507, 518-19 (2000); M. Lea et al., Knowing Me, Knowing
You: Anonymity Effects on Social Identity Processes within Groups, 27 PERSONALITY Soc.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 526, 528 (2001); Gary Charness, Eman Harvuvy & Doron Sonsino, Social
Distance and Reciprocity: An Internet Experiment, 63 J. EcON. BEHAV. & ORG. 88, 101
(2007); Lars Backstrom et al., Group Formation in Large Social Networks: Membership,
Growth, and Evolution, THE TWELFTH ACM SIGKDD INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON
KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY AND DATA MINING (2006), http://delivery.acm.org/10,1145/
1160000/1150412/p44backstrom.pdfkeyl=1 150412&key2=1624210921&coll=DL&dl=A
CM&CFID= 111637878&CFTOKEN=33799724 (last visited Oct. 31, 2010).
'9 Ostrom, supra note 14, at 140-41; see also NICHOLAS A. CHRISTAKIS & JAMES H.
FOWLER, CONNECTED 286 (2009) ("[T]he spread of emotions seems to require face-to-face
interaction. So while online connections increase the frequency of contact, it is not clear
whether this has the same effect as being present in person.").
140 Elinor Ostrom et al., Covenants With and Without a Sword: Self-Governance is
Possible, 86 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 404,410 (1992).
141 Mass tort litigants already form connections with one another through these social
networking sites. For examples, see the "Agent Orange Lawsuit Filed by Vietnamese
Victims" Facebook group, "Equal Treatment for Non-US Vioxx Victims" Facebook group,
which petitioned for compensation on behalf of British victims, and the "Merck Settlement
Group" on Yahoo!'s groups page. Agent Orange Lawsuit Filed by Vietnamese Victims,
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Although interacting personally is easier in cases with less geographic
dispersion, creating a social network could be accomplished on a smaller scale
through regionally held meetings where the special officer "rides the circuit."
For example, both Judge Weinstein in the Agent Orange litigation and Ken
Feinberg in administering the September 11 Victim's Compensation Fund did
just that. 142 In Agent Orange, Judge Weinstein traveled throughout the
country, held an unparalleled number of fairness hearings, and listened to
numerous class members' comments.143 Ken Feinberg followed suit by
conducting scores of town-hall meetings in schools, community centers, and
hotels from New York to California.'" Non-legal examples include the 2008
presidential race, which relied heavily on a combination of the Internet,
YouTube, mobile technology, grassroots level town-hall meetings, and
community-based "house parties" to disseminate campaign information and
mobilize support.145 Similarly, activist Oscar Morales started a Facebook
group to protest FARC's (a Columbian military group) holding hostages and
used online networks to organize real-world marches; his Facebook group led
to 4.8 million people attending roughly four-hundred events on the same day
throughout the world.146
Technology has changed the way we interact with one another socially, but
it has also provided a means for facilitating traditional face-to-face
interaction.147 Plaintiffs might use these new communication media to set up
FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/group.php?sid=0&gid=2619520859 (last visited Oct.
21, 2010); Equal Treatment for Non-US Vioxx Victims, FACEBOOK, http://www.face
book.com/group.phpgid=8611202842 (last visited Oct. 31, 2010); MerckSettlement, YAHOO
GROUPS, http://groups.yahoo.com/group/MerckSettlement/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2010)
(Yahoo Groups page dedicated to connecting potential Merk plaintiffs with one another).
142 KENNETH R. FEINBERG, WHAT IS LIFE WORTH?: THE UNPRECEDENTED EFFORT TO
COMPENSATE THE VICTIMS OF 9/11, at 55-60 (2005).
143 Peter H. Schuck, The Role of Judges in Settling Complex Cases: The Agent Orange
Example, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 337, 357-58 (1986). Judge Weinstein did something similar in
the DES cases. See Deborah R. Hensler, A Glass HalfFull, a Glass HalfEmpty: The Use of
Alternative Dispute Resolution in Mass Personal Injury Litigation, 73 TEx. L. REv. 1587,
1621 n.190 (1995). Although Judge Weinstein certified Agent Orange as a class action,
there is ample reason after Amchem, Ortiz, and CAFA to believe that it could not be
certified today. See NAGAREDA, supra note 9, at 74-75.
144 FEINBERG, supra note 142, at 47-49.
145 See, e.g., About Organizing for America, ORGANIZING FOR AMERICA, http://www.bara
ckobama.com/leam/about_ofa.php (last visited Oct. 21, 2010). For more information about
how the Obama campaign used YouTube to advertise and combat negative stories, see
CHRISTAKIS & FOWLER, supra note 139, at 204-05.
146 See CHRISTAKIS & FOWLER, supra note 139, at 205; L.A. Henao, Columbians Tell
FARC: "Enough's Enough", CHRISTIAN ScI. MONITOR, Feb. 6, 2008, at 25.
147 Burch, supra note 82, at 900 (citing a website for Navy Moms that provides "meeting
kits" to facilitate local face-to-face gatherings).
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regional face-to-face meetings, discuss key decisions, receive attorney updates
and recent court documents, pose questions, tell their stories, and generally
keep in touch with one another. 148 In short, this kind of technology makes it
easier for geographically dispersed plaintiffs to coordinate initial meetings and,
subsequently, to communicate, deliberate, and bargain with each other.
B. Sorting
Thus far, we have considered two tools for promoting cooperation - using
special officers and encouraging plaintiffs to communicate with one another.
But sometimes communicating and specifying goals can cause even the most
robust group to splinter. Church denominations are prime examples;
congregations divide over doctrine and the spin-off groups form churches of
their own. People within these groups sort themselves based on ideology and
social ties. But plaintiffs - at least currently - lack leadership as well as
critical information about others' ends, choice of law, evidentiary issues, and
the science used to establish causation. Consequently, they cannot rationally
self-sort or self-govern. The following two sections explain how the two
procedural tools just discussed can lead to better sorting and thereby minimize
inadequate representation, bolster procedural justice, and enable self-
governance.
First, consider the sorting problem. Because Rules 42 and 20 insist only on
a common question of law or fact, procedurally aggregated plaintiffs may have
only nominally related claims. 149 Plus, attorneys tend to prefer lumping to
sorting since, in general, representing more people leads to a higher fee and a
greater ability to invest resources in the litigation. Sorting clients into more
cohesive groups risks unearthing conflicts of interest, which may make joint
representation openly problematic by jeopardizing adequate representation and
due process. Ultimately, it may raise the need for informed consent or
alternative representation.150
Viewed as a product of sorting, subgroups might benefit litigants by
reordering nominally aligned interests into more cohesive units, which would
prevent quasi-private ordering from oppressing or disempowering certain
148 See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG., supra note 20, at § 1.05 cmt (i);
Paulette Rogers, My Story, PLAINTIFF'S VIEW, http://www.plaintiffsview.org/MyStoryPaul
ette.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2010) (providing a forum for Vioxx plaintiffs to tell their
stories). For a general description of the various ways that class-action plaintiffs can use
and benefit from internet communications see Robert H. Klonoff et al., Making Class
Actions Work: The Untapped Potential of the Internet, 69 U. PITT. L. REv. 727, 763-64
(2008).
149 FED. R. CIv. P. 20(a)(2); FED. R. Civ. P.42(a).
1o See MODEL RULES PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmts. 2-5 (describing how to identify and
address a conflict of interest).
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litigants.15' Consequently, encouraging plaintiffs (during their discussion) to
associate with others who share their litigation goals, injuries, and claims can
ameliorate significant conflicts of interest. Because plaintiffs usually lack the
information and legal knowledge they need to evaluate their claims vis-a-vis
others or to give informed consent to conflicts, the special officer is of
particular use here. By working with all of the plaintiffs, special officers will
have some idea about injury severity, causation problems, evidentiary gaps,
and differences in substantive laws, which means that they can use sorting to
minimize conflicts of interest. The optimal subgroup is one in which plaintiffs
want to achieve roughly similar remedies and share similar factual and legal
issues. Although identifying similar factual and legal issues is no easy task
given the variation among state laws, one might begin by identifying what
constitutes the "same issue" from a preclusion standpoint.152
Admittedly, over-sorting is similarly problematic and can lead to highly
factionalized entities that undermine both the litigation's efficiency and the
otherwise credible threat to defendants.153  Consequently, sorting "should
generally be used only to address conflicts on central issues or to facilitate the
development of issues that, being unique to certain individuals, are unlikely to
be addressed otherwise."' 54  The touchstone of sorting is thus to satisfy
constitutional due process requirements. 55
'5' See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623 (1997); Hansberry v. Lee,
311 U.S. 32, 45 (1940) (explaining that a group cannot be said to adequately represent the
class in litigating their interests simply because they are members of that class); PRINCIPLES
OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG., supra note 20, at § 1.05(c)(8) (recommending that judges
employ case-management techniques such as severance, subclassing, coordination, and
consolidation to ensure adequate representation).
152 This inquiry might focus on similar substantive laws and common evidence. The
Restatement suggests several factors to consider in deciding what constitutes the "same
issue," including:
Is there a substantial overlap between the evidence or argument to be advanced in the
second proceeding and that advanced in the first? Does the new evidence or argument
involve application of the same rule of law as that involved in the prior proceeding?
Could pretrial preparation and discovery relating to the matter presented in the first
action reasonably be expected to have embraced the matter sought to be presented in
the second? How closely related are the claims involved in the two proceedings?
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 cmt. c (1980); see also PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW
OF AGGREGATE LITIG., supra note 20, at § 2.01 ("Common issues are those legal or factual
issues that are the same in functional content across multiple civil claims, regardless of
whether their disposition would resolve all contested issues in the litigation.").
"I John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty
in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370, 374-75 (2000) (discussing
"Balkanization" of the class that results from requiring excessive subclassing).
154 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG., supra note 20, at § 1.05 cmt. k.
15 See Amchem Prods., 521 U.S. at 627 (recognizing the importance of identifying
subgroups and ensuring they are adequately represented); Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Co. 456
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This Article's focus on homogeneity and group cohesion within subgroups
reflects this concern about adequate representation and due process. Yet,
isolating homogeneous subgroups risks group polarization and could lack the
benefits of diversity. As Howard Reingold's Smart Mobs, 15 6 Jim Surowiecki's
Wisdom of Crowds,157 and Scott Page's The Difference' have demonstrated
through social science, groups of diverse people can make more accurate
predictions, carry out tasks, solve problems, improve performance, and
aggregate information better than non-diverse groups. These potential benefits
are, however, subject to two critical caveats: (1) fighting over common
resources - such as settlement funds - makes diverse groups less productive
and (2) failing to communicate with one another undermines any benefit. 59
Consequently, to reap diversity's benefits in mass litigation, cohesive
subgroups should communicate with other subgroups. And outliers - or as
Cass Sunstein might label them, "dissenters,"' 6 0 - should be permitted to
remain outsiders.161 Just as law schools hire consultants from other law
schools to make suggestions for improvement, diverse perspectives from other
subgroup members and outliers can challenge the status quo and suggest new
insights. These dissenting voices might come directly from plaintiffs or from
their attorneys.
Another way to think about the value of diversity among the plaintiffs as a
whole is through pluralism in political settings. Like political pluralism,
conversation among plaintiffs within diverse subgroups can expose plaintiffs to
multiple perspectives on remedies and new ideas. It can also lead to forceful
advocacy that results in well-developed arguments, increased legitimacy, and
dissenters who are ultimately more willing to accept the outcome.'62 So some
U.S. 461, 462 (1982) (holding that due process requires plaintiffs be given a "full and fair
opportunity to litigate"); Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 45 (explaining that nominal membership in
a class does not ensure one's individual interests are adequately represented during
litigation); Linda S. Mullenix, Taking Adequacy Seriously: The Inadequate Assessment of
Adequacy in Litigation and Settlement Classes, 57 VAND. L. REv. 1687, 1733-41 (2004);
Patrick Woolley, Rethinking the Adequacy of Adequate Representation, 75 TEx. L. REV.
571, 602-03 (1997).
156 HOWARD REINGOLD, SMART MOBs 179 (2002) ("[A] diversity of cooperation
thresholds among . .. individuals can tip a crowd into a sudden epidemic cooperation.").
157 JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDs 36 (2004) (stating that homogeneous
groups present groupthink problems that more diverse groups do 
not).
ScoTT E. PAGE, THE DIFFERENCE: HOW THE POWER OF DIVERSITY CREATES BETTER
GROUPS, FIRMS, SCHOOLS, AND SOCIETIES 155-58 (2007)
15 Id., at 335.
160 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT 14 (2003) (explaining that even a
single "dissenter" can have a huge impact that benefits everyone by breaking the barriers of
groupthink).
161 See PAGE, supra note 158, at 343.
162 W. RUSSELL NEUMAN, THE PARADOX OF MASS POLITICS: KNOWLEDGE AND OPINION IN
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conflict and dissonance is beneficial; it encourages novel solutions, diverse
ideas, and innovative problem-solving.16 3 As game theorists suggest, increased
participation and bargaining - more "trades" - promotes more solutions.164
Thus, the more initial disagreement about what is important, the appropriate
remedy, legal strategies, and appropriate goals (publicity, education,
compensation, and even public shaming), the better.
On the other hand, like pluralism, subgroups can lead to group polarization
and manageability problems, which raises the question of when, whether, and
how to unite divided subgroups (or at least reach a collective decision). In
part, the answer lies in exposing these subgroups to one another and fostering
deliberation among them.165 And, in part, the answer requires identifying
whether the conflict is one over outcomes (ends) or over how plaintiffs achieve
what they want (means).
When the conflict is over litigation means, it is far less problematic and can,
as noted, lead to better substantive outcomes through bargaining, deliberating,
and ultimately - perhaps - voting. But when the disagreement is over ends and
a settlement offer is conditioned on unanimous or nearly unanimous consent,
then, at least currently, plaintiffs must reach some compromise before the
superordinate group can move forward.166 As I suggest shortly, it may also
indicate that the system should allow subgroups with fundamentally
inconsistent ends to exit the superordinate group and pursue separate
litigation.167 Viewing a disagreement over ends as an either-or proposition - a
choice - is more problematic than framing it as a problem-solving or practical-
reasoning challenge. For example, within a group of potential Gardasil
plaintiffs, some might prefer to report adverse reactions to the FDA and
encourage it to recall the vaccine, others might want to educate the public
through media coverage, others might want to speak against mandating the
vaccine in state legislative hearings, and still others might want compensation
THE AMERICAN ELECTORATE 126-27 (1986); Rhode, supra note 64, at 1222-23. For a general
account of pluralism in the political process, see ROBERT A. DAHL, DILEMMAS OF PLURALIST
DEMOCRACY: AUTONOMY V. CONTROL 31-54 (1982); ROBERT A. DAHL, PLURALIST
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES: CONFLICT AND CONSENT 23-24 (1967).
16' Lisa Troyer & Reef Youngreen, Conflict and Creativity in Groups, 65 J. SOC. ISSUES
409,413 (2009).
164 See, e.g., HOWARD RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION 255 (1982).
165 See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY GROUPS Go To EXTREMES (2008). Cf CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, GOING TO EXTREMES: How LIKE MINDS UNITE AND DIVIDE 145-47 (2009)
(arguing that checks and balances in partisan politics constrains group polarization and
extreme movements).
166 See PAGE, supra note 158, at 349.
167 See infra Part III.D.3. Although I raise the issue here as a placeholder, this promises
to be the main topic of a future article. Note, however, that allowing groups to splinter off
into their own litigation may lose the benefits of diversity and may create a problem with
inconsistent remedies.
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for injuries. Bargaining and deliberating over these ends may ultimately result
in a decision to litigate - a compromise of sorts.168 These diverse ends might
come up again if plaintiffs receive a settlement offer with a confidentiality
provision. To find a solution that they might all agree to, again, plaintiffs
would need to articulate their values, desires, and intentions. When consensus
seems impossible, plaintiffs might prefer a collective decision-making
procedure that, as discussed shortly, includes a democratic vote to aggregate
preferences and put the matter to rest.169
C. Group Governance
In raising the possibility of collective-governance procedures, I recognize
both the potential for diverse, factionalized subgroups and the realistic concern
that not all plaintiffs want litigation to become their life. In the latter sense,
collaborative litigation becomes something of a nuisance, another distraction to
squeeze into their already busy days. Plaintiffs may thus want a quicker
resolution so that they can put that part of their lives behind them. Or, even if
they want to participate, they may be physically or mentally unable to, as were
some of the Zyprexa plaintiffs who suffered from serious psychotic disorders.
This raises the question of whether face-to-face group discussion and
deliberation should be optional and, if so, whether the enthusiasts who do
participate will fairly represent the spectrum of interests that would otherwise
emerge.
While it is surely right that not all plaintiffs want to interact regularly, I
nevertheless suspect that many do since plaintiff groups already form on an ad
hoc basis.170 Remember that litigants in nonclass aggregation have retained an
attorney to pursue claims related to their health and safety. Their claims are
deeply personal and they might sue even absent collective litigation.
Accordingly, litigants tend to expect the autonomous decision-making and
voice opportunities that typically accompany their day in court.171
168 See MICHAEL E. BRATMAN, Shared Intention, in FACES OF INTENTION 109, 116-22
(1999) (describing how participants can jointly agree on a course of action while having
different reasons for doing so).
169 See infra Part Ill.C.2.
'10 For example, veterans' groups organized Agent Orange litigants. Deborah R. Hensler
& Mark A Peterson, Understanding Mass Personal Injury Litigation: A Socio-Legal
Analysis, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 961, 1023 (1993). Groups such as the Asbestos Victims of
America, the Dalkon Shield victims' organizations, and the Silicone Breast Implant
organizations, also formed after the triggering event. Id. at 1024; Byron G. Stier, Resolving
the Class Action Crisis: Mass Tort Litigation as Network, 2005 UTAH L. REv. 863, 919-21
(2005) (discussing how these victim groups can both facilitate litigation and provide other
assistance through emotional support, information, and media attention).
"' Procedural Justice, supra note 5, at 48-50 (explaining the day in court ideal as a
willingness-to-accept problem).
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Consequently, it seems that increased opportunities for group deliberation and
decision-making might be a welcome change.
Although it should remain within the judge's discretion to mandate
participation and interacting face-to-face (at least initially) is preferred,172
plaintiffs might devise a representative governance structure with voting
mechanisms. That arrangement should, however, come only after initial
meetings (that might be held regionally) and after plaintiffs, with the special
officer's help, sort into groups with similar injuries and remedies. 73
Contending that litigants should have a hand in engineering their
governance arrangements doesn't say much about how these arrangements
might unfold, how litigants develop moral obligations and communal
encumbrances in the process, or how they might transition from moral
obligations to legal ones. In the course of forming groups, deliberating, and
sorting, plaintiffs tend to develop other-regarding preferences, display concern
and awareness for fellow group members, and make promises and
commitments to one another. 174  There is ample intuitive and empirical
evidence demonstrating that people act altruistically, follow social norms,
listen to their moral conscience, and prefer fairness and reciprocity.175 And the
social and personal norms associated with keeping promises regularly compel
people to follow through even in one-shot interactions where anonymity is
assured and group exposure is minimal. 76
172 See ELINOR OSTROM ET AL., RULES, GAMES, AND COMMON-POOL RESOURCES 171
(1994).
"7 This helps ensure adequate representation and maintains legitimacy if litigants choose
a representative governance model instead of direct participation through deliberation.
174 See Robert Axelrod & William D. Hamilton, The Evolution of Cooperation, 211
SCIENCE 1390, 1393 (1981); Nancy R. Buchan et al., Let's Get Personal: An International
Examination of the Influence of Communication, Culture and Social Distance on Other
Regarding Preferences, 60 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 373, 374-75 (2006); Joseph Henrich,
Cultural Group Selection, Coevolutionary Processes and Large-Scale Cooperation, 53 J.
ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 3, 9-12 (2004) (explaining how reciprocity and punishment systems
develop in group interaction); Mark Van Vugt & Claire M. Hart, Social Identity as Social
Glue: The Origins of Group Loyalty, 86 J. PERSONALITY & Soc.PSYCHOL. 585, 586 (2004).
"s See Dawes, supra note 51, at 176; Shinada & Yamagishi, supra note 54, at 94. See
generally Mark Van Vugt et al., Competitive Altruism: A Theory of Reputation-Based
Cooperation in Groups, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY 531
(R.I.M. Dunbar & Louise Barrett eds., 2007). Granted, not all other-regarding preferences
are prosocial. Spite and punishment are common as well. But these also demonstrate that
the homo economicus is not the correct model because people spend personal resources to
punish, whereas no rational egoist would do so. See Ostrom, supra note 14, at 141.
176 Kelly S. Bouras & S.S. Komorita, Group Discussion and Cooperation in Social
Dilemmas, 22 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1144, 1144-50 (1996); N.L. Kerr et al.,
That Still, Small Voice: Commitment to Cooperate as an Internalized Versus a Social Norm,
23 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1300,1300-11 (1997).
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Plaintiffs who make reciprocal promises and assurances to cooperate with
one another incur moral obligations that include obligations of solidarity.177
Theoretically, these moral obligations might legally bind litigants, too. But
discerning and enforcing moral interconnectedness requires a mind reader, not
a judge. Although litigants become part of a group when they recognize
interconnections, only some connections are obligations. Of those, only some
are proportional and reciprocal.1 78 Plus, promises and assurances may be
implicit or tacit and may evolve through reciprocal exchanges. Thus,
determining when litigants morally obligate themselves to one another from an
outside perspective is a first-order question riddled with ambiguity.
Accordingly, this section considers three broad types of agreement that may be
placed roughly along a continuum from most to least ambiguous. As shown,
these different types of agreements are more effective with certain group
cohesion levels:
AGREEMENT FORMALITY
AMBIGUITY CERTAINTY
Tacit coordination Promise-keeping norms Intra-claimant governance
Hypothetical consent Informal agreements agreement
Social contract theory Agreements to agree
SUPERORDINATE OR SUBGROUP COHESION
MORE COHESIVE LESS COHESIVE
Frequent face-to-face
interaction
Perhaps less geographic
Dispersion
1. Tacit Coordination, Social Norms, and Moral Obligations
At the ambiguous extreme, Thomas Schelling has demonstrated that people
coordinate tacitly even when they never meet each other. He asked
participants in New York City who wanted to find one another, but had no
prearranged plans, where and what time they would meet.179 The majority said
17 Group Consensus, Individual Consent, supra note 13 (manuscript at 15); SANDEL,
supra note 84, at 223-25.
178 My thanks to J.B. Ruhl for pointing this out to me.
" THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 56 (1980).
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they would go to Grand Central Station at noon.180 So sometimes when people
mutually recognize a coordinating signal they will cooperate tacitly.18
Schelling suggests that the moral power of distributive-fairness norms provides
a similar signal in complex-decision problems. 182 The trouble is, plaintiffs
may not have a common understanding of "what's fair" when group members
suffer assorted levels of harm, live in jurisdictions with disparate laws, and
have stronger or weaker legal cases. Uncertainty comes not only in
determining what's fair, but also in ascertaining the number of group members
and the potential settlement terms. Although desires to achieve distributive
fairness (based on either true fairness concerns or instrumental motiveSl 83) are
well-documented behavioral determinants, it is impossible for plaintiffs to
proportionately distribute resources when they lack this knowledge.184
Between this extreme, which is too ambiguous to be legally binding, and the
other extreme of a formal intraclaimant-governance agreement, exists a wide
body of literature ranging from the social norms of promise-keeping,
reciprocity, and fairness, to contracts as promises, informal contracts, and
agreements to agree. This literature suggests that: (1) agreements may be self-
enforcing even when they are not legally enforceable, (2) sometimes ambiguity
is both deliberate and beneficial, and (3) incompletely specified agreements
that make reciprocation possible may be more efficient than concrete, legally
enforceable ones.
At the heart of the moral condition that I proposed for incurring an
obligation lies the promise principle.185 The principle is age old: people should
keep their word. Indeed, as Charles Fried argues, that same principle
comprises contract law's moral foundation.'86 Even the Restatement (Second)
of Contracts contends that a "contract is a promise or a set of promises for the
I Id. at 56-57.
18 Id. at 54.
Id. at 72-73.
183 Fairness may be a means to an end for some rather than an end in and of itself. It may
be a strategic consideration, as some behavioral economists contend. See, e.g., John H.
Kagel et al., Fairness in Ultimatum Games with Asymmetric Information and Asymmetric
Payoffs, 13 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 100, 100 (1996). The proselfs may still desire
distributive fairness because they may assume that unfair offers are likely to be rejected.
See Rachel T.A. Croson, Information in Ultimatum Games: An Experimental Study, 30 J.
ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 197, 197-98 (1996); Madan M. Pillutla & J. Keith Murnighan,
Fairness in Bargaining, 16 Soc. JUST. RESEARCH 241, 241-42 (2003); van Dijk & De
Cremer, supra note 44, at 15 1.
184 van Dijk & De Cremer, supra note 44, at 148-50; see also Fehr & Schmidt, supra
note 54, at 817; David A. Schroeder et al., Justice Within Social Dilemmas, 7 PERSONALITY
& Soc. PSYCHOL. REv. 374, 374 (2003).
185 Supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text (describing this moral obligation).
"6 CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 1
(1981).
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breach of which the law gives a remedy."187 Yet, promises may not be as
explicit as saying "I promise" or "I agree"; instead, they may be inferred from
intentional conduct or tacit agreements.18 In agreements to agree, plaintiffs
might openly acknowledge the agreement's indefiniteness as well as their
intention to continue negotiating, deliberating, or bargaining to reach further
agreement. 189
This idea of adding flesh to the agreement later is inherent in Michael
Bratman's planning theory of practical reasoning.190 That is, people are
planners and their plans are often partial. Only later do they fill in their plans
by specifying means, methods, and action.191 Their plans are also hierarchical:
general plans necessarily contain preliminary steps and subplans to eventually
attain one goal.192 For instance, plaintiffs might have overarching fixed ends
(to prevail against the defendant), but must deliberate and bargain about how
and whether to coordinate their activity, what that day-to-day activity should
entail, and how to specify their shared ends in ways that eventually resist
reconsideration and control conduct. Upon reaching rough consensus, they
might clarify their coordination and commitment to a shared plan through
common understanding.193
The question is whether these rather nebulous ideas about bargaining and
planning can bind plaintiffs legally or whether extra-legal understandings
might sometimes prove self-enforcing. The latter notion insinuates that the
liberal ethic of reciprocity, making and keeping promises, and communal
obligations of solidarity may be all that is necessary. In fact, people routinely
demonstrate a robust preference for keeping promises, fairness, and
reciprocity.194 As such, agreements are self-enforcing not only because of
" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1981).
188 Id. § 4. Even making an explicit promise may lead to disagreement about the exact
nature of that promise and how to go about discharging that moral duty. See Curtis
Bridgeman, Contracts as Plans, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 341, 376 n.238.
189 Omri Ben-Shahar, "Agreeing to Disagree": Filling Gaps in Deliberately Incomplete
Contracts, 2004 Wis. L. REV. 389, 395-396. This includes the obligation to bargain and
negotiate in good faith. Charles L. Knapp, Enforcing the Contract to Bargain, 44 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 673, 679-81 (1969).
190 See MICHAEL E. BRATMAN, INTENTIONS, PLANS, AND PRACTICAL REASON 29-30
(1987).
191 Id.
192 Id
11 See Bridgeman, supra note 188, at 374-75.
194 See, e.g., Cristina Bicchieri & Azi Lev-On, Computer-Mediated Communication and
Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: An Experimental Analysis, 6 POLITICS, PHIL. & ECON. 139,
142 (2007); Sanford L. Braver, Social Contracts and the Provision of Public Goods, in
SOCIAL DILEMMAS: PERSPECTIVES ON INDIVIDUALS AND GROUPS 69, 70 (David A. Schroeder
ed., 1995) (challenging the traditional economic assumption that individuals exclusively
pursue their self-interests); Tore Ellingsen & Mangus Johannesson, Promises, Threats and
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promise-keeping norms, but also because of extralegal enforcement
mechanisms including reputational sanctions and reciprocity. 195
Granted, reputational sanctions in geographically dispersed litigation, where
the plaintiffs are not repeat players, may be less effective than in cases such as
environmental torts that involve pre-existing neighborhoods and communities.
Yet, pre-existing groups may encounter different obstacles. For instance,
where plaintiffs are also neighbors, their shared history may impact their
willingness to collaborate. They might be socially ostracized, disputing over
boundaries, or even friends. The group is not operating on a blank slate;
litigating together is not a one-shot interaction. Instead, plaintiffs have extra-
legal, interpersonal concerns.196
Although geographically dispersed plaintiffs may care less about
reputational sanctions, reciprocity still plays a vital role in self-enforcing
agreements. Reciprocity differs from reputation in that it persists in one-shot
interactions between complete strangers and is tethered neither to reputation
nor future interaction.197 "Reciprocity" characterizes a social preference for
responding in kind to both altruism and hostility.198 Put simply, it means that
people treat others as others have treated them. This means that reciprocally
Fairness, 114 EcON. J. 397, 417 (2004) ("[F]airmindedness strengthens the credibility of
promises"); Komorita, supra note 128, at 614-15 (concluding that reciprocal strategies
induce cooperation); Ostrom, supra note 140, at 410; Christoph Vanberg, Why Do People
Keep Their Promises? An Experimental Test of Two Explanations, 76 ECONOMETRICA 1467-
80 (Nov. 2008), available at
http://www.uibk.ac.at/economics/bbl/teachingws0809/vanbergnew. pdf
'9' See Fehr & Schmidt, supra note 54, at 852; Ernst Fehr et al., Reciprocity as a
Contract Enforcement Device: Experimental Evidence, 65 ECONOMETRICA 833, 833 (1997);
Lewis A. Kornhauser, Reliance, Reputation, and Breach of Contract, 26 J.L. & EcON. 691,
699-703 (1983); Eric A. Posner, The Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and
Nonlegal Sanctions on Collective Action, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 133, 155 (1996); Robert E.
Scott, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 1641, 1680-81
(2003). See generally DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 541-46 (L. A. Selby-
Bigge ed., 2d ed. 1978) (finding that promises are dependent on both moral obligations and
government enforcement); Lester G. Telser, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Agreements, 53 J.
Bus. 27, 37 (1980); infra notes 234-240 and accompanying text.
196 See David De Cremer, Respect and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: The Importance
of Feeling Included, 28 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1335, 1335 (2002); Tom R.
Tyler & Peter Degoey, Collective Restraint in Social Dilemmas: Procedural Justice and
Social Identification Effects on Support for Authorities, 69 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL.
482,482 (1995).
19 Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, Why Social Preferences Matter - The Impact of Non-
Selfish Motives on Competition, Cooperation and Incentives, 112 ECON. J. Cl, C3 (2002).
198 See id; S. S. Komorita et al., Reciprocity and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas, 35 J.
CONFLICT RESOL. 494, 495 (1991).
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fair plaintiffs will bear costs in order to keep their promises and achieve an
equitable outcome, as well as to punish selfish behavior. 199
These self-enforcement mechanisms explain, in part, the general prevalence
of agreements to agree as comforting arrangements despite judicial hesitance
to enforce them. It also suggests that incompletely specified agreements that
leave room for reciprocity ultimately might be more efficient than fully
specified, legally enforceable ones. Given the strong evidence of self-
enforcing reciprocity, some commentators have even claimed that creating
opportunities for parties to exploit this tendency best serves the ends of
fairness and efficiency.200  Others have proposed that partial agreements
deserve partial legal enforcement when contractual incompleteness is a
deliberate choice. 201
This suggests that backing an agreement with legally enforceable sanctions
may actually diminish reciprocity and overall performance. 202 Put differently,
the ex ante threat of legal sanctions may undermine voluntary cooperation
where reciprocity and reputational sanctions would otherwise promote self-
enforcement. 203  Accordingly, pre-existing groups such as close-knit
communities, neighborhood associations, and veterans' organizations might
benefit more from self-enforcing, non-legal agreements than explicit contracts.
Still, people develop social ties and attachments relatively quickly.204
Consequently, self-enforcing arrangements might benefit groups that form
even after the litigation begins, such as the Asbestos Victims of America, the
Dalkon Shield victims' organizations, the Merck Settlement Group, and the
Silicone Breast Implant organizations. 205
19 See Scott, supra note 195, at 1677-78.
200 Id. at 1645.
20 See, e.g., Ben-Shahar, supra note 189, at 389-90. Incomplete agreements are often
filled using "reasonable hypothetical consent ('mimicking' or 'majoritarian' default rules). .
." Id. at 390. But see Scott, supra note 195, at 1688-91 (arguing that courts "may actually
undermine the very norms of fairness that the legal system seeks to advance" by gap-
filling).
202 See Scott, supra note 195, at 1689-90 (citing experiments by Fehr and G5chter, Ernst
Fehr & Simon Gdchter, Do Incentive Contracts Undermine Voluntary Cooperation? (Inst.
for Empirical Research in Econ., Univ. of Zurich, Working Paper No. 34, 2002), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=313028).
203 Reciprocity and reputational concerns, along with trustworthiness, are most robust
when people cooperate with one another over time in repeated interactions. See Frans van
Dijk et al., Social Ties in a Public Good Experiment, 85 J. PUB. EcoN. 275, 291-92 (2002).
204 See id; see also Roy F. Baumeister & Mark R. Leary, The Need to Belong: Desire for
Interpersonal Attachments as a Fundamental Human Motivation, 117 PSYCHOL. BULL. 497,
501 (1995).
205 Hensler & Peterson, supra note 170, at 1024; Stier, supra note 170, at 919-21.
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2. Intraclaimant-Governance Agreements
If we assume that some people are selfish whereas others are fair-minded,
that we will sometimes need more than social norms, or that some obligations
might be non-proportional and non-reciprocal to the group as a whole, then we
might prefer something more definite. But how much more definite?
Generally, for an agreement to be legally enforceable, all parties must intend to
be bound by it and agree to its material terms, those terms must be sufficiently
definite, and the obligation must be mutual.206
This suggests a place at the other end of the extreme for a legally
enforceable agreement. Claimants might use such an agreement to designate
subgroup representatives, spell out a deliberative decision-making process, and
bind plaintiffs through a vote. Deliberation and discussion are, however,
necessary antecedents for procedural fairness. 207 Ensuring procedural justice
through both voice opportunities in shaping the agreement and input and
review by the special officer makes it more likely that consenting plaintiffs
will adhere to the agreement.208 Those preconditions also facilitate sorting,
group formation, and communication. After that, subgroups and superordinate
groups could memorialize their commitments to other subgroup members and
other plaintiff groups in a legally recognizable way. Plaintiffs desiring what I
call an "intraclaimant-governance agreement," should do so only after
hammering out its core details, consulting with their attorneys, and seeking
input from the special officer. In short, vesting plaintiffs with this kind of
decision-making authority requires highly informed consent. 209
Majoritarian alternatives allow litigants to participate in decision-making
either directly or through representatives who have clearly articulated fiduciary
duties to the represented group.210 A representative structure might include
plaintiff delegates who, alongside attorneys on a plaintiff's steering committee,
present their "constituents" interests during plaintiff's consortium meetings
and ensure that the attorneys periodically update the group on significant
developments. 211 Fiduciary duties combined with the consent of the governed
206 See Eastbanc, Inc. v. Georgetown Park Assocs. II, L.P., 940 A.2d 996, 1002 (D.C.
2008); 1 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS (4TH) § 3:2.
207 See Musante et al., supra note 125, at 237-38; Donna Shestowsky, Procedural
Preferences in Alternative Dispute Resolution: A Closer, Modem Look at an Old Idea, 10
PSYCHOL., PUB. POLICY, & L. 211, 243 (2004).
208 See Dean G. Pruitt et al., Long-Term Success in Mediation, 17 LAW & HUMAN BEHAV.
313, 327-28 (1993).
20' See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG., supra note 20, at § 3.17(b)(3), (4).
210 See Rhode, supra note 64, at 1221-25; Shestowsky, supra note 207, at 233, 243
(observing that litigants prefer either well-established court rules or ex ante agreed on
procedures).
211 For a general analysis of the costs and benefits of agency in the political context, see
Samuel Issacharoff & Daniel R. Ortiz, Governing Through Intermediaries, 85 VA. L. REv.
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legitimize this representative structure; but, as with any principal-agent
relationship, they also create the risk of wayward agents.
Like the American Law Institute's alternative procedure for binding
litigants, 212 a formal intraclaimant-governance agreement would require that
state legislatures amend Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.8(g), the
aggregate-settlement rule. That rule allows each client to consider her portion
of the settlement pie in light of what others would receive and then
individually decide to accept or reject the offer.213  An intraclaimant-
governance agreement would abrogate only an individual's ability to accept or
reject her proceeds. In its place, after considering the entire allocation scheme
(or the indivisible remedy), each plaintiff would vote to accept or reject the
offer. The outcome would bind all voting plaintiffs regardless of how each
voted individually. In the process of discussing and deliberating about how to
vote, the group might also propose a counter-offer and specify its core terms.
As further considered in the subsequent sections on sanctions and exit, the
judge should respect and enforce this arrangement so long as it ensures
adequate representation and is fair and reasonable. 214
Thus far, we have considered how encouraging plaintiffs to communicate
can lead them to form groups and develop other-regarding preferences, how
using a special officer can enhance the sorting process by filling in
informational asymmetries and ensuring adequate representation, and how
plaintiffs might then self-govern through various arrangements. These
arrangements run the gamut from self-enforcing to formal intraclaimant-
governance agreements. Fair procedures in both making and enforcing these
agreements increase prosocial behavior, strengthen group commitment,
discourage opting out or leaving the group, and enhance the group's authority
and legitimacy.215
1627 (1999).
212 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG., supra note 20, at § 3.17(b).
213 Advanced waiver of conflicts of interest and full knowledge of others' settlement
terms departs from standard practice under Model Rules of Professional Conduct 1.8(g).
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(g) (2003) ("A lawyer who represents two or more
clients shall not participate in making an aggregate settlement . . . ."); cf Tax Auth., Inc. v.
Jackson Hewitt, Inc., 898 A.2d 512, 514-15 (N.J. 2006) (holding that New Jersey's Rule of
Professional Conduct 1.8(g) "prohibits an attorney who represents more than one client
from entering into an aggregate settlement of the clients' claims without each client
consenting to the settlement after its terms are known"); see also Nancy J. Moore, The
American Law Institute's Draft Proposal to Bypass the Aggregate Settlement Rule: Do Mass
Tort Clients Need (or Want) Group Decision Making?, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 395, 403-04
(2008) (examining walk-away provisions and holdout litigants in settlements).
214 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG., supra note 20, §§ 1.05 (c)(1), 3.17(b);
see also infra notes 247-253 and accompanying text (describing a limited fairness review
procedure).
215 TOM R. TYLER & STEVEN L. BLADER, COOPERATION IN GROUPS: PROCEDURAL JUSTICE,
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To harmonize the concepts of communication, sorting, and governance,
consider a political analogy. In the political realm, healthcare reformers and
scientists advocating stem-cell research might support the same presidential
contender. Each group shares a common framework - campaigning and voting
for a candidate - but does so for unique reasons. 216 Likewise, each plaintiff
subgroup desires a roughly similar end - a judgment against the defendant -
but may want different remedies. Once the president wins or a defendant
offers to settle, various interest groups then jockey for their own agendas.
Although the compatibility inherent in plaintiffs' initial common framework
might lead them to bargain, deliberate, and ultimately develop a shared policy
to govern their subsequent deliberations, inter-group compatibility might prove
difficult. Hence, as with voting in the political process, the superordinate
plaintiff group may need a governance agreement that binds subgroups through
a vote. This agreement could employ a weighted voting structure akin to that
used by the Electoral College in selecting a President. There, the decennial
census reapportions the number of electors allocated to each state. 217
Similarly, the plaintiffs with the strongest causation or most severe injuries
could have a voting block that roughly correlates with their claims' strength.
This would alleviate some concern about a majority of weak claimants voting
for and receiving a disproportionately large payout.
D. When Social Glue Doesn't Stick
The previous sections sketched a blueprint for cooperatively litigating
together by delineating the theory, methods, and objectives for mitigating the
agency and group problems identified in Part I. As such, the blueprint
represents an ideal based on realistic parameters. But many obstacles exist that
make litigating together more arduous. Two sticking points come to mind:
dissimilar personalities and larger group size.218 Approaching group dynamics
in nonclass aggregation holistically needs nuance and must assess how both
SOCIAL IDENTITY, AND BEHAVIORAL ENGAGEMENT 79 (2000) (citing numerous studies
supporting these conclusions).
216 Michael E. Bratman, Dynamics of Sociality, 30 MIDWEST STUD. IN PHIL. 1, 4-5 (2006)
("Such sharing does not require commonality in each agent's reasons for participating in the
sharing . . . . We participate for different reasons, but our shared valuing nevertheless
establishes a common framework.").
27 See A Procedural Guide to the Electoral College, U.S. ELECTORAL COLLEGE,
http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/electoral-college/procedural guide.html ("Each
state's allotment of electors is equal to the number of House members to which it is entitled
plus two Senators."). Another alternative might be a point system like that used for
allocating kidneys in the United States. See H. PEYTON YOUNG, EQUITY: IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE 27-31 (1994).
218 Geographic dispersion similarly adds to the difficulty of cooperation. This topic has,
however, already been discussed. See supra notes 141-148 and accompanying text.
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group size and social and instrumental motivations affect cooperative behavior
and moral obligations.219  That some people act fair-mindedly and are
concerned with equal treatment while others behave selfishly has important
consequences for engineering and implementing a framework that diminishes
group and agency problems.
Social preferences impact whether litigating together will result in
cooperative gains or mutual frustration. In some sense, we are all Janus-faced
- at various times we are self-regarding and other-regarding. 220 We are not all
homo economicus, nor are we all Mother Theresa; we are a heterogeneous
bunch. As contemplated thus far, many of us are motivated by fairness, equal
treatment, and reciprocity concerns. We give money to charities and are nice
to strangers, but we are also quick to give disapproving glares when someone
breaks ahead of us in line. We act with mixed motives that fluctuate
depending on social cues and context. 221 For example, we all tend toward a
norm of distributive fairness, but some of us are truly concerned about
achieving fairness, whereas others tend to use the norm for strategic,
instrumental reasons to maximize their own outcome. 222
In addition to variations among social motivations, cooperation negatively
correlates with group size. 223 The larger the group the more anonymous its
219 As Tom Tyler and David De Cremer describe: "Instrumental motivations reflect
people's desire to gain material resources and avoid material losses. Social motives, as
discussed by psychologists, differ in that they are motivations that flow from within the
person, leading to self-regulatory behaviors." Tom R. Tyler & David De Cremer,
Cooperation in Groups, in SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND EcoNoMIcs 155, 157 (David De
Cremer et al. eds., 2006).
220 Stout, supra note 14, at 22-23.
221 Ostrom, supra note 14, at 148; see also Eric van Dijk et al., Social Value Orientations
and the Strategic Use of Fairness in Ultimatum Bargaining, 40 J. EXPER. Soc. PSYCHOL.
697, 699 (2004) (classifying individuals into prosocial or proself categories based on six
choices and excluding a number of individuals who could not be classified).
222 See van Dijk & De Cremer, supra note 44, at 146-47; Paul A.M. Van Lange & D.
Michael Kuhlman, Social Value Orientations and Impressions of Partner's Honesty and
Intelligence: A Test of the Might Versus Morality Effect, 67 J. PERSONALITY & Soc.
PSYCHOL. 126, 127 (1994); see also Tommy Garling, Value Priorities, Social Value
Orientations and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas, 38 BRIT. J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 397, 397-99
(1999) (finding a relationship between justice and social value orientations); Ostrom, supra
note 14, at 138 ("A central finding is that the world contains multiple types of individuals,
some more willing than others to initiate reciprocity to achieve the benefits of collective
action.").
223 See Phillip Bonacich et al., Cooperation and Group Size in the N-Person Prisoner's
Dilemma, 20 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 687, 687-705 (1976); Norbert L. Kerr & Steven E. Bruun,
Dispensability of Member Effort and Group Motivational Losses: Free-Rider Effects, 44 J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 78, 78-94 (1983); Norbert L. Kerr, Illusions of Efficacy: The
Effects of Group Size on Perceived Efficacy in Social Dilemmas, 25 J. EXPER. SOC.
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members are to one another, the less they tend to develop other-regarding
preferences, and the easier it becomes to defect discretely. 224  Although
organizational costs increase, even large-scale groups might cooperate if it is
possible to reward cooperators and punish defectors.225 In 1965, Mancur
Olson provocatively contended that "unless the number of individuals in a
group is quite small, or unless there is coercion or some other special device to
make individuals act in their common interest, rational, self-interested
individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interests." 226 Yet,
we see plenty of contrary examples where people elevate communal interests
over their own: people volunteer, donate money to charities, help strangers in
car accidents, and exhibit other altruistic behaviors.
So far, this Article has focused on factors that affect individuals' behavior
such as social norms, communication, trust in other group members, moral
obligations, social values and responsibility, and in-group identity. In the
course of litigating together, plaintiffs develop positive other-regarding
preferences, act morally, follow through on their promises, and achieve their
substantive ends through their joint power. They have opted to bind their fate
with others; they have come to the table and collectively shared in the fruits
and failings of their joint labor. But there are some leftovers, some
discontents, some who partake of the benefits but then try to shirk the burdens.
Olson is thus at- least partially right: some self-interested individuals are
tempted to free ride in collective-action problems, including those inherent in
large-scale litigation. Because we live within a heterogeneous population, self-
interested litigants may cooperate only so long as it benefits them. 227 Two
mechanisms help lessen the negative externalities of this tendency: (1) as
noted, sorting litigants into groups that share ends better aligns personal and
collective interests and (2) sanctioning opportunistic defectors may decrease
the individual rewards of defecting. 228
Problems with holdouts and outliers can be mitigated or, ironically,
exacerbated, to promote substantive and procedural justice through carrots,
sticks, and doors. But first a brief caveat: remember that strategic self-
PSYCHOL. 287,309 (1989).
224 Dawes, supra note 51, at 169; Kollock, supra note 126, at 201-02.
225 See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 53-65 (1971); Dawes, supra
note 51, at 169 (stating that individuals generally stand more to gain from defecting than
cooperating in social dilemmas).
226 OLSON, supra note 225, at 2 (emphasis omitted).
227 See Ernst Fehr & Herbert Gintis, Human Motivation and Social Cooperation:
Experimental and Analytical Foundations, 33 ANN. REV. SOCIOL. 43, 46 (2007).
22 Id. at 47-48 (finding that, in public-goods games, giving subjects an opportunity to
punish other group members resulted in nearly all members cooperating and allocating to
the public good, whereas, in the same experiment without the punishment mechanism,
roughly fifty-five percent of the subjects contributed nothing).
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interested plaintiffs are not the only ones who wish to defect or remain outside
the group. Plaintiffs may refuse to join the group or want to leave for
legitimate reasons. The money offered might not be enough to cover doctor's
visits, hospital bills, or funeral expenses. Or they might prefer extra-legal
objectives like educating the public or forcing defendants to change their
marketing or labeling practices. The problem may thus be a function of
improper sorting. Or, despite proper sorting, defendants may condition their
offers on unanimous or nearly unanimous consent such that some subgroups
must compromise.
This is the principal disparity between class litigation and nonclass
litigation: in nonclass litigation, the plaintiffs care enough to hire their own
attorneys. They are neither nameless nor faceless, but camouflaged in a sea of
others with similar complaints. Granted, some will care more than others and
the litigation may attract gadflies with little or no injury who want an easy
paycheck. In the class context, on the other hand, class members may be
oblivious to or ambivalent about the litigation. The point is that not all
holdouts withhold consent for selfish, opportunistic, or illegitimate reasons.
This fact matters when we consider incentives for attracting outliers into the
group, the effects of informal and structural sanctions on illegitimate and
opportunistic behavior, and the availability of exit opportunities.229
1. Carrots for Outliers
Consider first why carrots might appeal to outliers. As explained, courts
and communities of plaintiffs cannot bind outliers through hypothetical
consent or some metaphysical construction of political commitments. Because
they have not joined the group, any presumed cohesion remains speculative
and fictitious. Yet, outliers may not remain in the shadows forever. Rather,
they might decide to join the community if it offers them incentives. 230
Because these incentives are now well known, I'll mention them only briefly
here. First, typical incentives include sharing information, splitting discovery
costs, retaining expert witnesses, developing the science to prove causation,
and orchestrating jury focus groups and mock trials. 231 Second, plaintiffs
litigating collaboratively bring together various attorneys, each with talents and
expertise that range from negotiating to trying cases. Third, plaintiffs may
229 See Messick & Brewer, supra note 126, at 11-44; Shinada & Yamagishi, supra note
54, at 95.
230 See, e.g., GREEN, supra note 36, at 240-41 (discussing the benefits of multidistrict
consolidation, such as efficiency and sharing of resources).
231 See Howard M. Erichson, Informal Aggregation: Procedural and Ethical
Implications of Coordination Among Counsel in Related Lawsuits, 50 DUKE L.J. 381, 388
(2000) (stating that attorneys litigating "similar claims against a common defendant . . .
benefit greatly from teamwork"); Paul D. Rheingold, The Development of Litigation
Groups, 6 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 1, 5 (1982); Stier, supra note 170, at 896-9 10.
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benefit directly from the chance to discuss their experiences with one another,
tell their stories, and express anger and grief.2 32 Finally, and perhaps most
importantly, litigating with other plaintiffs overcomes the David versus Goliath
effect.
In sum, ample incentives already exist to entice outliers into the group's
fold. But if, despite these incentives, outliers want no part of group
membership, then the system should allow them to remain autonomous and
stay outside the group. Neither the historical development of group litigation
nor current class-action theory justifies binding them. After all, the right to sue
for tort claims is held individually and obligations of solidarity or membership
arise only after plaintiffs define the membership through their voluntary
associations. 233 As I explore below, allowing adamant outliers to remain
autonomous provides an important check on substantive fairness. Dissenting,
in essence, enables them to play the role an objector would in a class action.
2. Sticks for Holdouts
Sticks - internal social sanctions or external structural sanctions - diminish
the strategic holdout problem. In particular, sanctions should be aimed at
individuals who have joined the group, received its benefits, made promises to
the group as a whole, but then act to its detriment by engaging in strategic,
opportunistic behavior for selfish purposes.
Groups opting for self-enforcing arrangements tend to police them through
internal, group-based social sanctions. Social sanctioning draws its force from
moral obligations and social norms, thus the coercive aspect comes from group
members themselves. For instance, the least cooperative member might be
alienated, peer pressured, confronted, and gossiped about. 234  Should a
potential holdout act selfishly and threaten the group's welfare, that action
232 See E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL
JUSTICE 106 (1988) (reasoning that opportunity to express one's views is critical to
procedural fairness perceptions).
233 This is the principal break from Michael Sandel's version of communitarianism.
Plaintiffs' voluntary associations can be captured, at least initially, through the liberal ethic
of consent. See SANDEL, supra note 84, at 241; Burch, supra note 82, at 907.
234 PETER M. BLAU, EXCHANGE AND POWER IN SOCIAL LIFE 47 (1964); Robert C.
Ellickson, The Evolution of Social Norms: A Perspective from the Legal Academy, in
SOCIAL NORMs 35,37 (Michael Hechter & Karl-Dieter Opp eds., 2001); Ernst Fehr & Simon
Gachter, Altruistic Punishment in Humans, 415 NATURE 137, 137-140 (2002)
("[C]ooperation flourishes if altruistic punishment is possible, and breaks down if it is ruled
out."); Ernst Fehr & Simon Gachter, Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods
Experiments, 90 AM. ECON. REv. 980, 980-94 (2000); Sally Engle Merry, Rethinking Gossip
and Scandal, in TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF SOCIAL CONTROL 271, 284-86 (Donald
Black ed., 1984).
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would invite spite, disapproval, and ostracism. 23 5 Consider, for example, the
extreme emotions that subjects demonstrate in a classic experimental social-
dilemma setting:
Comments such as, "If you defect on the rest of us, you're going to have
to live with it the rest of your life," were not at all uncommon. Nor was it
unusual for people to wish to leave the experimental building by the back
door, to claim that they did not wish to see the "sons of bitches" who
doublecrossed them, to become extremely angry at other subjects, or to
become tearful. 236
As noted, group members regularly promise each other that they will
cooperate. 237  If close-knit group members contemplate violating these
commitment norms or breaking their promises, then social sanctioning may
effectively deter or punish them.238 Sanctioning changes the calculus, even for
self-interested individuals. Rather than acting on a quick monetary cost-
benefit analysis, they will have to factor in social costs, the lack of future
reciprocity, and possible reputational damage.
Because social sanctions rely on our sociality, they tend to be less effective
in groups that are loosely constituted or merely procedurally aggregated.
Group solidarity is more likely in litigation with little geographic dispersion
where plaintiffs interact face-to-face during both group discussion and
everyday activities. Of course, large-scale litigation routinely takes years to
resolve. So, even interacting during litigation allows plaintiffs to form groups,
establish community norms, and chastise norm-violators. 239 In short, the more
cohesive the group, the more likely it is to self-regulate. 240
Social sanctioning is less effective when communicated outside of face-to-
face interaction. 241 Thus, in geographically dispersed, large-scale litigation,
235 Stout, supra note 14, at 31-32.
236 Robyn Dawes et al., Behavior, Communication, and Assumptions About Other
People's Behavior in a Commons Dilemma Situation, 35 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL.
1, 7 (1977), reprinted in RATIONALITY AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF
ROBYN MASON DAWES 345, 355 (2008).
237 See Norbert L. Kerr, Anonymity and Social Control in Social Dilemmas, in
RESOLVING SOCIAL DILEMMAS 103, 105 (Margaret Foddy et al. eds., 1999).
238 See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES
208-10, 225-29, 230-33 (1991).
239 OSTROM, supra note 172, at 171.
240 See Posner, supra note 195, at 155.
241 See OSTROM, supra note 172, at 171; Dawes, supra note 236, at 1 ("Results showed
defection significantly higher in the no-communication and irrelevant-communication
conditions than in relevant-communication and relevant-communication plus roll call
condition."); Ostrom, supra note 140, at 410-11; Shinada & Yamagishi, supra note 54, at
110; Abigail Barr, Social Dilemmas and Shame-Based Sanctions: Experimental Results
from Rural Zimbabwe 13-14 (Ctr. for the Study of African Econs., Working Paper No. 149,
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where sustained face-to-face interaction is not feasible and there is less
communication, higher levels of anonymity, and perhaps lower group
solidarity, institutional sanctioning through the judicial system may be a better
fit. To ensure that institutional sanctions are available, however, plaintiffs
need a formal, intraclaimant-governance agreement. A sanctioning scenario
might unfold like this: (1) defendant offers to settle, (2) the relevant plaintiffs'
group or subgroup votes in accordance with their outlined agreement, (3) the
vote garners the prescribed majority, and (4) dissatisfied minority members
initiate other lawsuits to either attack the majority result directly or sue the
defendant again.242 The group's remedy is then to intervene in the collateral
attack, sue for breach of contract, or request an injunction or a stay.
In general, people are more willing to establish and fund sanctioning
systems in larger groups than smaller ones, and increased group size tends to
positively correlate with cooperation when sanctioning opportunities exist. 243
Yet, there are several potential drawbacks to institutional sanctioning: the time
it takes to achieve initial agreement and to reduce that agreement to specific
contractual terms; enforcement expense; and settlement delay. Plaintiffs could
avoid some expense and delay by including an exclusive forum-selection
clause that designates their current forum. This does not, however, avoid the
cost of additional attorneys' fees, litigation expenses, and some settlement
delay. These punishment costs may exceed any benefits gained from a
cooperative boost. 244 Moreover, recall that the threat of ex ante legal sanctions
2001), available at http://www.bepress.com/cgilviewcontent.cgi?article=1150&context-c
sae ("[I]n those communities where individuals are more willing to criticise non-cooperators
and less interested in criticising cooperators in order to save face, more cooperative
outcomes result.").
242 As explored shortly, a limited judicial fairness review provides a legitimate outlet for
minority dissenters to challenge the settlement. See infra notes 247-252 and accompanying
text.
243 See, e.g., T. Yamagishi, Group Size and the Provision of a Sanctioning System in a
Social Dilemma, in SOCIAL DILEMMA: THEORETICAL ISSUES AND RESEARCH FINDINGS 267,
267-87 (W.B.G. Liebrand et al. eds., 1992). Such studies are, however, conducted
principally in public-goods dilemmas (as opposed to common-pool dilemmas) and thus
employ a give frame rather than a take frame. Public-goods problems tend to trigger loss
aversion and less cooperation than commons dilemmas (take frames), which more closely
approximate the situation in large-scale litigation. In commons dilemmas, reward systems
tend to elicit greater cooperation than sanctions. See Christopher McCusker & Peter J.
Carnevale, Framing in Resource Dilemmas: Loss Aversion and the Moderating Effects of
Sanctions, 61 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 190, 197-98 (1995). For an
explanation of how non-class aggregation relates to common pool dilemmas, see supra
notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
244 See, e.g., Olivier Bochet et al., Communication and Punishment in Voluntary
Contribution Experiments, 60 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 11 (2006) (finding through
experimentation that punishments increase contributions to public good but have little net
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may undermine voluntary cooperation where reciprocity and reputational
sanctions would otherwise encourage self-governance.2 45 Further,
psychologists contend that structural sanctions have negative psychological
effects, destroy intrinsic motivation for cooperation, lessen any sense of
community, and decrease trust; thus, the more we use them, the more we need
them.246 Yet, the less interaction plaintiffs have, the fewer their opportunities
for social sanctioning and the greater the need for structural solutions.
In sum, the potential for informal, internal social sanctions and structural
sanctions through judicial enforcement suggests two rough models:
effect on efficiency because of high costs).
245 Scott, supra note 195, at 1689-90 (citing Ernst Fehr & Gachter, Do Incentive
Contracts Undermine Voluntary Cooperation? (Inst. for Empirical Res. in Econ., Univ. of
Zurich, Working Paper No. 34, 2002), available at http://www.iew.unizh.ch/wp/iewwp03
4.pdf (suggesting "that explicit incentives may have costly side effects)); supra notes 194-
195 and accompanying text.
246 Shinada & Yamagishi, supra note 54, at 112-13 (surveying a number of research
experiments on "The Dark Side of Sanctions"). See generally MICHAEL TAYLOR, ANARCHY
AND COOPERATION (1976) (examining the effects on public goods of strong centralized
states as opposed to anarchy); Mark R. Lepper et al., Undermining Children's Intrinsic
Interest with Extrinsic Reward: A Test of the "Overjustification" Hypothesis, 28 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 129 (1973).
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Internal Social
Sanctions
Less formal
agreements that are
principally self-
enforcing
Stronger network ties
and group cohesion
within either the
subgroup or
superordinate group
Frequent interaction
and discussion among
subgroups, potentially
less geographic
dispersion
Structural Sanctions
Through Judicial
Contract
Enforcement
Formal intraclaimant
governance agreement
Weaker social
Snetworks and fewer
affective ties
Less frequent
interaction and
potentially greater
geographic dispersion
At the risk of oversimplifying a spectrum of agreements and sanctions into a
dichotomous relationship, these models illustrate two possibilities. First,
where plaintiffs rountinely interact face-to-face or stay in touch after meeting
one another, either on a superordinate or subgroup level, less formal
arrangements (such as agreements to agree and promises) may sufficiently glue
the group together and deter strategic holdouts. The group self-polices through
social sanctions. Second, where plaintiffs interact less and principally rely on
designated repesentatives to act on their behalf, social sanctioning has less
punitive force. Accordingly, these plaintiffs may prefer, in the long run, the
hassle of expounding and engineering a formal intraclaimant-governance
agreement that memorializes their rights and obligations to one another. If a
plaintiff then breaches the agreement, the remaining group members have legal
recourse through the judicial system.
3. Doors as Signals and Exit as a Safety Valve
Whether these sanctioning mechanisms should apply to plaintiffs who have
acted in good faith but find that their litigation ends are incompatible with the
group's litigation ends is a tougher question. Ideally, this should be part of the
sorting process where plaintiffs specify their ends and align themselves with
others whose ends and injuries mesh with their own. Once this occurs and
142 [Vol. 91: 87
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plaintiffs then agree to a collective decision-making arrangement, they should
be compelled - through social or structural sanctions - to remain part of their
group.
My principal interest here, however, is when the legal system should enforce
plaintiffs' obligations, which means they must have an intraclaimant-
governance agreement in place. In that case, if plaintiffs claim that the
agreement is unfair, they are entitled to a limited judicial fairness review. 247
Remember that plaintiffs haven't consented to a contract's actual substantive
terms, but rather to a process that then binds them to the substantive terms.
Because of this and because the government has a legitimate interest in
refusing to enforce terms that are harmful or exploitative, judges should
conduct a limited fairness review before enforcing an intraclaimant-
governance agreement. 248
To defer to plaintiffs' decision-making autonomy, this limited fairness
review should proceed in two steps. 249 First, the settlement proponents must
prove that the process was fair. During this process-dependent check, the
judge examines the process used to sort plaintiffs, ensures that plaintiffs gave
fully informed consent to the agreement, and that the attorneys adequately
represented plaintiffs. 250 Put simply, the judge considers the agreement's
voluntary character and whether plaintiffs freely consented to it. Once the
proponents establish that the process was fair, this creates a rebuttable
presumption that the agreement should be enforced. Second, the burden then
shifts to the challengers to prove that the settlement's substantive terms are
overtly unfair, such as settling a wrongful death claim for peanuts or vastly
overcompensating weak claims.251 Accordingly, the judge conducts a content-
247 See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG. § 3.18(a) (2010) ("Any
claimant who is subject to a settlement . . . is entitled . . . to challenge the settlement on the
grounds that the settlement . . . is not procedurally and substantively fair . . . .").
248 See Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Paternalism, Unconscionability Doctrine, and
Accommodation, 29 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 205, 224 (2000) (arguing that the unconscionability
doctrine is not paternalistic because the government has an interest in refusing to put its
stamp of approval on an agreement that is "harmful, exploitative, or immoral").
249 For a detailed account of this fairness review, see Group Consensus, Individual
Consent, supra note 13, at 22-25.
250 The American Law Institute suggests that judges consider:
[T]he timing of the agreement, the sophistication of the claimants, the information
disclosed to the claimants, whether the terms of the settlement were reviewed by a
neutral or special master as defined in § 3.09(a)(2), whether the claimants have some
prior common relationship, and whether the claims of the claimants are similar.
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG., § 3.17(d) (2010). Section 3.18(a) also refers
to section 3.17(d).
251 The American Law Institute proposes that judges consider "the costs, risks,
probability of success, and delays in achieving a verdict; whether the claimants are treated
equitably (relative to each other) based on their facts and circumstances; and whether
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dependent check with a light touch. In general, if the process is fair, then a
vote's outcome is likely the product of community consensus about the right
thing to do and the judge should take care not to second-guess those decisions.
If, however, the process-dependent check reveals tainted consent or some
other process-based defect, then the burden remains with the settlement
proponents to demonstrate substantive fairness. The judge would then conduct
her content-dependent check of the settlement's substantive terms with
increased rigor. What makes an agreement fair isn't just that plaintiffs
voluntarily agree to the process that produces it, but that the process produces
fair results. Thus, conducting a fairness review as a two-step inquiry maintains
a delicate balance. On one hand, it prevents the judge from simply substituting
her own judgment about "the right thing to do" for the group's, and thereby
preserves the claims of the community and decision-making autonomy. On the
other hand, it also promotes procedural fairness and maintains institutional
integrity.
Even so, exit and rumblings about exit may perform an important signaling
function.252 Thus far, voice has taken center-stage. One complement to this
system might be the ability to flee: to exit the process entirely by allowing the
individual or subgroup to maintain an independent action. Yet, this option
rarely exists in current practice because of both the central-planner model of
aggregation, where litigation proceeds collectively, and settlements designed to
deter opt outs.
Still, envision for a moment securities class actions where opting out has
become de rigueur. There, more and more class members vote with their feet
and thereby signal that the deal is unattractive. 253 This observation suggests
two thoughts, one applicable to this litigating-together approach, and one that
may commend a drastic restructuring of present practice. First, the more
modest thought: plaintiffs strongly desiring to exit their group or subgroups
struggling to pull away from the superordinate group may signal a problem
with substantive or procedural fairness. Investigating what caused the signal
could trigger the special officer or judge to reevaluate a particular decision,
further clarify or explain the bargaining and negotiating process that produced
the decision, or sanction opportunistic or illegitimate behavior. The ambitious
thought entails rethinking the central-planning model and all of its trappings -
the All Writs Act, Anti-Injunction Act, preclusion doctrines, and abstention
doctrines. Taking exit seriously means allowing plaintiffs with fundamental
differences over which ends to pursue and how to pursue them either to avoid
initial aggregation with disparate-minded plaintiffs or to exit aggregation when
particular claimants are disadvantaged by the settlement considered as a whole." Id. §
3.17(e).
252 See Issacharoff, Class Action Conflicts, supra note 8, at 833.
253 John C. Coffee, Jr., Accountability and Competition in Securities Class Actions: Why
"Exit" Works Better than "Voice", 30 CARDOZO L. REv. 407,425-29 (2008).
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conflicts over significant issues or ends arise. Given its wide-ranging impact, I
am content for now to raise this alternative as food for future thought.
IV. APPLICATIONS OF AND SPILLOVERS FROM LITIGATING TOGETHER
This final Part brings us full-circle to pull together some loose ends,
underscore the real-world impact, and explain how the spillovers from
enabling plaintiffs to specify and pursue their litigation objectives together
diminish agency, group, and procedural-justice problems. Thus far, this
Article has refrained a systemic dilemma to find a workable procedural
framework that is tethered to its moorings in substantive law, morality, and
procedural justice. What's left then is applying that framework pragmatically.
Accordingly, this Part first considers an economic problem that hinders
plaintiffs in pursuing their litigation goals, contemplates how litigating
together impacts process-based ends, and applies this approach by considering
how it might have worked in the Vioxx litigation.
A. The Economic Disjunction
First, consider a critical economic problem - that plaintiffs' attorneys have
little incentive to bring claims on behalf of plaintiffs who want something
other than monetary remedies. If the studies by Relis and Hadfield are right -
that litigants aren't always in it just for the money but for extra-legal objectives
like promoting change and accountability, educating the public, and receiving
judgments of accountability and apologieS254 - then we have a serious
economic disjunction. Although plaintiffs' personal-injury and product-
liability claims tend to be independently economically viable, the first few
cases are extraordinarily expensive to litigate. One plaintiffs' lawyer estimated
that initial cases cost between $1 million and $1.5 million to develop.255 But
once the litigation machine is up and running, the attorneys turn their collective
wisdom into trial packages so that others can litigate similar cases for around
$200,000.256 Attorneys have to recoup these costs somehow. Their current
incentive is the contingency fee. After spending around $100 million
developing the Vioxx litigation and setting for $4.85 billion, plaintiffs' lawyers
received approximately $1.5 billion in fees.257 What this means for plaintiffs,
however, is that there is little room for them to litigate on principal. Even the
254 See Relis, supra note 55, at 744 (concluding that there is an "ideological dissonance
that exists between how plaintiffs and the justice system, through its actors, view disputes");
Hadfield, supra note 58, at 649 ("[L]itigation represents more to some potential litigants
than a means to satisfying private material ends; it represents principled participation in a
process that is constitutive of a community.").
255 Joe Nocera, Forget Fair; It's Litigation as Usual, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2007, at CI.
256 Id
257 Id
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purest-hearted attorney crusader may be hard pressed to justify spending that
much money on principle.
The implications of this economic disjunction reach further than I can fully
address in this Article, but I offer a few initial thoughts and requests for
additional research. First, we need additional data. Relis studied medical
injuries and Hadfield studied September 11 litigants.258 These studies replicate
anecdotal evidence from Vioxx litigants, but further studies are needed.
Second, we need to have frank conversations about whether judicially
litigating mass-tort claims is the right way to regulate. Although I prefer a
cadre of private attorneys' general to agency action or inaction, this debate
continues, particularly in the preemption literature. 259 Finally, if I am right
about this - and many would disagree - then Congress should enact a fee-
shifting statute akin to those in civil-rights litigation. 260 These statutes require
losing defendants to pay "reasonable" plaintiffs' attorneys' fees. They would
thus incentivize attorneys to give voice to plaintiffs who see their litigation
experience as one that furthers public discourse, educates the public, prompts
corporate changes, and promotes communal civic values.261
Still, even under current practice, this litigating-together approach prompts
some changes in this direction. No longer can plaintiffs' attorneys act
independently; by specifying their litigation aims and working collaboratively,
plaintiffs have the ability to monitor their attorneys and see to it that their
interests roughly align. And yet, this alternative offers attorneys peace of mind
by lessening the ambiguity inherent in multiple-client representation, the
potential for a legal malpractice claim, and the possible reputational harm from
dissatisfied clients. If, as some suspect, conflicts of interest are "the greatest
source of legal malpractice," 262 then better sorting, a special officer's
258 See Hadfield, supra note 58; Relis, supra note 55. For references to other studies, see
supra note 57 (listing articles studying plaintiffs' "extra-legal objectives").
259 See generally Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, CAFA's Impact on Litigation as a Public
Good, 29 CARDOZO L. REv. 2517 (2008) (detailing the author's skepticism about corporate
fear of regulating agencies).
260 1 thank Richard Nagareda for pointing this out to me.
261 For examples of civil rights statutes that require losing defendants to pay "reasonable"
plaintiffs' attorneys fees, see the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C.
§ 626(b) (2006); the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b)
(2006); Title Vll of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k); and the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12205. For examples of other statutes
promoting the public interest that also permit fee-shifting, see the Privacy Act of 1974, 5
U.S.C. § 552a(g)(2)(B), (g)(3)(B) (2006); the Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. §
552b(i) ; the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2412(b), 2412(d) (2006); and the
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(f) (2006).
262 Peter Szendro, Legal Malpractice - Pitfalls and Solutions, 609 PLI/LIT. 325, 330
(1999).
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"blessing," and truly informed consent through plaintiff education should
alleviate both ambiguity and malpractice concerns. 263
B. Facilitating Process-Based Ends
This litigating-together approach also impacts process. The process litigants
use to achieve substantive justice is one way to specify abstract systemic ends
as more concrete. Accordingly, I call these sub-ends "process-based ends,"
because they potentially distort or further litigants' substantive pursuits of
justice. My particular concern is for two process-based ends: (1) procedural
justice, defined as a fair means for applying legal norms and resolution
procedures in a way that psychologically satisfies litigants;264 and (2) equitable
allocation of divisible remedies (such as money) and majority consensus for
relief that includes indivisible remedies (such as declaratory or injunctive
relief).265
First, remember that procedural justice's primary components include: the
adversarial process; opportunities for voice and participation; impartial,
nonbiased decision makers; and mechanisms for error correction, the use of
precedent, and equitable error distribution.266 Yet, in mass litigation, the
judge's role tends to change from arbiter to inquisitor and she has ample self-
interest in promoting settlement. Although settlement typically trades error-
correction mechanisms for consent, the coercive aspects of tainted consent and
fractured agency relationships in mass litigation corrupt this exchange. 267
Finally, claimants vastly outnumber the judge, which makes voice and
participation opportunities scarce. Because plaintiffs currently participate
263 See Nancy J. Moore, Conflicts of Interest in the Simultaneous Representation of
Multiple Clients: A Proposed Solution to the Current Confusion and Controversy, 61 TEX.
L. REV. 211, 212 (1982) ("One of the most fertile sources of confusion has been the rules
dealing with multiple representation of clients with conflicting interests."); Szendro, supra
note 262, at 330; Developments in the Law: Conflicts ofInterest in the Legal Profession, 94
HARV. L. REV. 1244, 1247 (1981) ("From 1908 to the present, the lawyer with conflicting
interests has provided bench and bar with one of the toughest problems in legal ethics.").
264 Procedural Justice, supra note 5, at 8; Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S.
CAL. L. REV. 181, 238 (2004). Most empirical studies on bipolar litigation demonstrate that
cost and delay do not significantly affect litigants' procedural fairness opinions. See Burch,
supra note 25, at 34-35 (examining studies on the effect of cost and delay on litigants'
judgments of fairness).
265 As defined by the American Law Institute, divisible remedies "entail the distribution
of relief to one or more claimants individually, without determining in practical effect the
application or availability of the same remedy to any other claimant," whereas indivisible
remedies are remedies where "the distribution of relief to any claimant as a practical matter
determines the application or availability of the same remedy to other claimants."
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG., § 2.04(a), (b) (2010).
266 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
267 See Procedural Justice, supra note 5, at 35-37.
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through their attorneys, both communication and agency problems further
plague these already limited opportunities. 268
Second, trying to achieve equitable allocation for divisible remedies and
consensus for indivisible ones raises other concerns. 269 As detailed in Part I,
these obstacles include standard agency and group problems. In particular,
strategic holdouts and the temptation for attorneys to allocate resources based
on their own self-interest (i.e., overpaying weak injuries to attract additional
clients or paying less to those requiring a referral fee) afflict the allocation
process.270
This Article's litigating-together approach promises to lessen the barriers to
attaining these process-based ends and sits well (at least in most respects) with
a pragmatic approach to mass torts. It arms plaintiffs with special officers,
communication, proper sorting, deliberative decision-making, problem-solving
opportunities, and collective decision-making arrangements. It also firmly ties
these practices to the theoretical framework outlined in Litigating Groups and
recounted here. To explain, consider how litigating together might change the
Vioxx litigation. Recall that critics contended that the settlement was a
product of tainted consent because it: (1) required each plaintiffs' attorney to
recommend the deal to 100% of her clients and withdraw from representing
those who refused, (2) allowed Merck to walk-away from the deal and pay no
one (including plaintiffs' attorneys) without consent of 85% of the claimants,
and (3) forced those who refused the deal to continue litigating before Judge
Fallon (who pushed for a settlement from the beginning).271 Admittedly,
examining the Vioxx litigation requires a good bit of speculation and
imagination because we lack the information that would emerge during
plaintiffs' discussions. Moreover, it focuses on the meta-approach discussed
here rather than delving into the specifics of establishing scientific causation,
discovery, and negotiations. Nevertheless, it provides a concrete example of
268 See id. at 40 ("[T]he efficacy of counsel positively correlates with procedural fairness
judgments."); Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1, 30
(1988) ("Lawyers ... do influence their clients to some extent, whether they want to or
not."); Russell Korobkin & Chris Gutherie, Psychology, Economics, and Settlement: A New
Look at the Role of the Lawyer, 76 TEX. L. REV. 77, 82 (1997).
269 Although a group principally seeking an indivisible remedy is more likely to be
certified as a Rule 23(b)(1) or 23(b)(2) class and thus less likely to fall within the realm of
nonclass aggregation, litigants seeking divisible relief may also request an indivisible
remedy.
270 See Litigating Groups, supra note 5, at 12-16; Paul H. Edelman, Richard A. Nagareda
& Charles Silver, The Allocation Problem in Multiple-Claimant Representations, 14 SUP.
CT. ECON. REV. 95, 100 (2006).
271 Vioxx Settlement Agreement, supra note 1; see also Richard A. Nagareda, Embedded
Aggregation in Civil Litigation 49-52 (Vanderbilt Univ. Law Sch., Working Paper No. 09-
24, 2009), available at http://ssm.com/abstract- 1506460 (examining the settlement of the
Vioxx litigation using contracts with plaintiffs' law firms).
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how litigating together might work in large-scale, geographically dispersed
litigation.
C. Reconsidering Vioxx
Vioxx users alleged that the drug caused heart attacks, ischemic strokes, and
sudden cardiac death and that Merck should have known about the drug's
dangers and adequately warned them about its risks. Eventually, around forty-
nine thousand plaintiffs sued, alleged myriad causes of action, and requested
damages that ran the gamut from medical costs, to lost wages, to pain and
suffering, to medical monitoring, to punitive damages. But the litigation
started more modestly, with several thousand lawsuits consolidated through
multi-district litigation before Judge Fallon.
After multi-district transfer, under this litigating-together approach several
things should happen. First, Judge Fallon should request preliminary reports
on the common issues as well as the principal legal and factual claims. 272 This
provides some time for plaintiffs to file - and the Multi-District Litigation
Panel to transfer - tag-along cases. Second, before appointing lead attorneys,
Judge Fallon should appoint a special officer. Third, after notifying the
attorneys and publicizing the meetings, the special officer would hold a series
of regional meetings over several weeks with both plaintiffs and their
attorneys.
Depending on the number of people present, these meetings might range
from intimate gatherings to the large town-hall meetings seen in debates over
health-care reform. The special officer should explain her role, introduce the
attorneys present, and note the requested remedies and potential hurdles to
liability (such as problems with general and specific causation). She should
also explain that the meeting's purpose is to solicit feedback from claimants,
ensure adequate representation, and help them sort into groups with others who
share their aims and injuries. Plaintiffs should then be given some time to talk
with one another and to collectively discuss their litigation objectives.
Discussion can foster a sense of community, particularly when it allows the
plaintiffs to tell their stories, share their hardship, and talk about what should
be done. Vioxx plaintiffs wanted to educate the public about problems with
both Vioxx and other drugs, form alliances with consumer protection and
health organizations to promote systemic change, receive compensation for
their injuries, and have their injuries monitored through a medical monitoring
272 It generally takes a while for the Multi-District Litigation Panel to pick a judge,
transfer those cases to that judge, and for that judge to then request and receive preliminary
reports, affiliated counsel and companies, pending motions, and summaries of similar
litigation pending in state courts. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 22.61
(2004); see also Current Developments, MDL-1657 VIOXX PRODUCTS LIABILITY
LITIGATION, http://vioxx.laed.uscourts.gov/ (last updated Oct. 19, 2010) (providing a
timeline with links to minute orders and current developments).
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program. 273 Because plaintiffs do not always know what is feasible or which
remedies are available, the special officer should help them translate their
overarching litigation aims into concrete, legal remedies. For instance,
plaintiffs might express their desires for judgments of wrongdoing by
requesting punitive damages and further their quest for public education by
making discovery documents public.
This information-exchange does several things. It provides the information
that everyone involved needs about preference intensities, injury variation, and
litigation ends. This enables the claimants themselves to begin to self-sort,
with oversight from the special officer and their attorneys. It also serves as a
proxy for court-based participation. 274  In this sense, process is justice.275
These voice opportunities help assuage concerns about individual dignity,
transparency (at least from within the litigation itself), and participation. 276
Plaintiffs will have more information about the litigation process, the decisions
being made on their behalf, and the legal strength of their claims. Discussing
which ends to pursue and further specifying those ends together as legal
remedies allows: (1) plaintiffs to associate with like-minded others who share
claims and ends and (2) plaintiffs, their attorneys, and the special officer to
determine collaboratively whether the attorney can continue to adequately
represent them. Cohesive groups empowered with this information can better
monitor the attorneys, which mitigates most attorney-client agency problems.
After their attorneys and the special officer help sort Vioxx plaintiffs into
categories based on their desired remedies, injuries, or other central issues that
pose unique dividing lines, 2 77 several things might follow. First, plaintiffs with
related aims and injuries might file a single complaint to avoid the
complications that an overarching consolidated complaint would create.
Second, to help ensure adequate representation, Judge Fallon should appoint
lead plaintiffs' attorneys based on these categories. Third, those attorneys and
the special officer should design and implement means for plaintiffs to
273 See, e.g, Alex Berenson, In First of Many Vioxx Cases, a Texas Widow Prepares to
Take the Stand, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2005, at Cl; Gardiner Harris, F.D.A. Official Admits
'Lapses' on Vioxx, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2005, at Al5; E-mail from Al Pennington,
Moderator of the Merck Settlement Grp., to Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Assistant Professor
of Law, Fla. State Univ. Coll. of Law (Oct. 20, 2008, 01:22 AM) (on file with author).
274 See TYLER & BLADER, supra note 215, at 79, 85-86.
275 See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, When Litigation is Not the Only Way: Consensus
Building and Mediation as Public Interest Lawyering, 10 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 37, 39
(2002).
276 See Musante et al., supra note 125, at 223, 237-38 ("Regardless of role in a dispute,
the opportunity to exercise control through the selection of a decision rule (no matter what
the rule) resulted in enhanced evaluations of all aspects of the trial experience.").
277 For example, in the Vioxx litigation, plaintiffs attempted to certify a nationwide class
or, alternatively, state-specific class actions.
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communicate with each other within their category, across categories, and with
their attorneys. Options include modem technology, such as discussion groups
through Yahoo or Google, Facebook groups, or traditional face-to-face
meetings. Using these means, plaintiffs within the categories might nominate
and select plaintiff representatives to accompany the appointed attorneys. This
makes genuine participation in collective decision-making feasible. 278
Given their size and geographic dispersion, an intraclaimant-govemance
agreement would likely be the best option. Plaintiffs could either discuss this
possibility after sorting themselves into more cohesive groups during their
initial regional meeting or wait until they have selected representatives.
Although the agreement should ultimately be a product of bargaining, arguing,
and deliberating between the plaintiffs, where attorneys then draft the
agreement's core components, here are a few design options that they might
consider along with the benefits and drawbacks:
Design Option 1 - Overarching Agreement with a Simple-Majority Vote:
To simplify the numbers, let's assume there are 100 claimants rather than
49,000. Say that plaintiffs agree that 30 of them have strong claims -
severe injuries with few genetic predispositions or complicating factors
that could make causation difficult. All 100 agree to a simple
majoritarian voting procedure that requires a 51% majority without any
discussion.
This design has a very real potential to disadvantage those with the strongest
claims and the most litigating power. Fifty-one of the weaker claimants could
vote to accept a settlement offer that overcompensated them and vastly
discounted the stronger claims. In fact, something similar happened in
Combustion Engineering's asbestos-related reorganization plan.27 9 Under §
524(g) of the Bankruptcy Code, a seventy-five percent majority vote could
bind all present and future asbestos claims, regardless of which plaintiffs' firm
represented them, and thus deliver the finality needed to obtain future business
funding. 280 Leaving nothing to chance, the company hired Joseph Rice, a
prominent asbestos plaintiffs' attorney, to gamer the requisite votes.281 To put
the matter indelicately, the voting pool was diluted with weak claims to
gerrymander the requisite vote at the expense of future claimants and people
with serious injuries. 282
278 On the problem of deliberative economy, see John S. Dryzek, Legitimacy and
Economy in Deliberative Democracy, 29 PoL. THEORY 651 (2001).
279 In re Combustion Eng'g, 391 F.3d 190, 203-08 (3d Cir. 2004).
280 11 U.S.C. § 524(g) (2006); NAGAREDA, supra note 9, at 168-73.
2 NAGAREDA, supra note 9, at 169.
282 Id. at 170-73 ("[A] voting majority can be made to consist of non-malignant claimants
whose interests may be adverse to those claimants with more severe injuries." (quoting
Combustion Eng'g, 391 F.3d at 244)).
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Better, fairer designs exist. The Vioxx plaintiffs created a credible threat to
Merck in part through sheer numbers and in part through strong claims. Thus,
plaintiffs could tinker with their settlement design by combining one or more
variables: (1) the required majority (say, seventy-five percent instead of fifty-
one percent), (2) weighting votes (proportional voting based on claim
strength), and (3) deliberating before voting.
If approximately forty percent of litigants are principally concerned with
extra-legal objectives like educating the public and wanting to prevent future
calamities, and their subgroup's litigating power is strong enough, they might
prefer to go their separate ways. Yet, current aggregation and settlement
practices impede that option. These subgroups thus face three key decisions:
(1) how to make decisions within their subgroup, (2) how to bargain and
negotiate with other subgroups or the superordinate group to effectuate their
litigation ends, and (3) how to allocate authority among the various groups and
negotiate with one another when confronted with a decision that affects them
all (such as a settlement offer).
Design Option 2 - Agreements Governing Each Subgroup: Each
subgroup might design its own collective governance arrangement.
Under the current system, however, this poses a few problems. First, the
economic disjunction lessens the possibility that attorneys will represent
plaintiffs suing purely on principle unless that principle translates into
punitive damages. Second, the central-planning model makes
maintaining truly separate litigation unfeasible. Third, isolation from
other groups can lead to group polarization. And finally, the defendant
can offer to settle on whatever terms it wishes, which may cut across any
pre-existing lines. This means that each group will ultimately have to
determine whether to accept or reject the offer, but may lack the benefit
of deliberation across subgroups. On the positive side, if a subgroup is
strong enough, it may be able to bargain with the defendant independently
and thus enable those litigants to pursue their desired litigation ends.
Because their claims are not certified as a class action, a subsequent
settlement would not preclude (or further) others' litigation aims.
Design Option 3 - Deliberation followed by Overarching Supermajority
Vote: Assume the same thirty people have strong claims, but the group
designs its governance agreement so that it requires deliberation among
and between subgroups (here, just the two - the thirty stronger claims and
the seventy weaker ones). In addition, the settlement must be approved by
a seventy-five percent overarching supermajority.
Design Option 4 - Deliberation Followed by Overarching Vote with
Weighted Voting Blocks: For instance, suppose that the 30 stronger claims
are roughly twice as strong as the weak ones (in terms of being able to
prove specific causation and having severe injuries) and that they
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collectively decide to roughly correlate voting strength to claim strength,
2:1.283 This makes a purely self-interested vote in the group of 100
claimants 60 to 70. Add to that any one of the following changes likely
under this new approach - positive other-regarding preferences, people
making and keeping promises to one another, or the near universal norm
in favor of distributive fairness - and the likelihood of voting in favor of a
settlement with inequitable allocation diminishes. 284
Assume that Merck offers to settle for a lump sum of money so long as
eighty-five percent of the claimants sign-on, but does not admit to any
wrongdoing and demands that any documents that emerged during discovery
be kept confidential. As you might imagine, the public-minded plaintiffs who
want change and apologies are outraged. And they are not anomalies. For
instance, a woman paralyzed in a rollover accident demanded that Ford and
Firestone broadcast a videotaped apology to settle; Paula Jones demanded but
never received an apology from President Clinton; and Toyota has
preemptively apologized in recalling more than 8 million vehicles. 285 In
deliberating (as in the third and fourth design options), this group might appeal
to the common good by saying, "We've got to send Merck a message that it
can't push products like this into the market again," "The FDA rushed to
approve Vioxx and without public disclosure of Merck's documents, there's
little likelihood for systemic change," or "Merck has to admit to what it did
wrong." With equal conviction, others may appeal to their growing financial
difficulties. Take Paulette Rogers, for example. She had a heart attack after
taking Vioxx and said "When I returned to work my boss said they didn't need
me anymore and was afraid the stress of the job might hurt me. . . . During
that time we lost the new truck, I couldn't go camping because of my mental
state, and we almost lost our home." 286
This kind of split is hardly unusual; the question is how process can fairly
raise and resolve these disagreements. As in the third and fourth design
options, plaintiff groups might adopt some form of majoritarian or proportional
283 Another alternative might be a point system like that used for allocating kidneys in
the United States. See YOUNG, supra note 217, at 27-31.
284 People may invoke distributive fairness norms for different reasons. As Eric van Dijk
and David De Cremer explain, "fair offers do not necessarily reflect a true concern for
fairness, but might also reflect an instrumental concern because bargainers may fear that
unfair offers are likely to be rejected . . . ." van Dijk & De Cremer, supra note 44, at 146.
They note further that research shows that some are truly concerned about fairness, whereas,
others use fairness instrumentally. Id.; see also van Dijk, supra note 221, at 704.
285 O'Hara & Yarn, supra note 57, at 1125; Hiroko Tabuchi & Bill Vlasic, Toyota's Top
Executive Under Rising Pressure, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 6, 2010, at BI (reporting on Akio
Toyoda's apology for the Fall 2009 Toyota vehicle recall).
286 Paulette Rogers, My Story, PLAINTIFFS VIEW, http://www.plaintiffsview.org/MyStory
Paulette.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2010).
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voting both for their subgroup and for making overarching decisions. With the
special officer's help, they might bargain, deliberate, and ultimately
collaborate with other plaintiffs' groups to co-specify their ends. Litigating
together is partial here: plaintiffs participate for different background reasons,
but share a common framework - wanting to hold the defendant accountable.
Communicating their reasons for litigating - needing to pay hospital bills,
seeking retribution, helping others - might ultimately lead them to a mutually
acceptable alternative. 287 For example, initially adding a claim for punitive
damages might satisfy both those wanting compensation and those wanting to
prevent future harm. Punitive damages are thus one way to further specify
ends in a way that allows both groups to work together. This process enables
plaintiffs to attach various weights and intensities to the ends and means most
important to them and then to collectively consider this previously private,
nuanced information. When group members understand and trust that they
want roughly the same ends (prevailing against the defendant), they are less
likely to strategically misrepresent their preferences.
Even if it proves impossible to satisfy everyone, the process of bargaining
and deliberating makes it possible for plaintiffs to reason together about "the
right thing to do" and about what's best for the "common good." What the
common good is, is for the Vioxx plaintiffs to determine and pursue together.
The procedures that they implement will be the products of their community
consensus and will help further their substantive aims. The concerns that
emerge will inform both their decision to accept a settlement offer and, if not
dictated by the settlement's terms, how to allocate any settlement funds among
them. Remember that most people want to do "what's fair," but in asymmetric
dilemmas - where some are entitled to more than others - they lack critical
decision-making information. Information changes that equation.
Consequently, if Vioxx plaintiffs have formed a group and agreed to deliberate
and then be bound by a vote, they can take others' needs and preferences into
account.
But these tools still lack the error-correction mechanisms of both traditional
bipolar litigation (motions for a new trial, renewed motions for judgment as a
matter of law, and appeals) and class-action litigation (objections, judicial
determination of the settlement's fairness, and objector's appeals). This is
where outliers and limited judicial review play a potentially invaluable role.
First, as litigants outside of the group - and there are bound to be a few -
outliers provide a check on the settlement's fairness through the voice of
dissent.288 Because outliers are not part of the group, they feel little or no
obligation to the group as a whole and may not "go along to get along."
287 See MICHAEL E. BRATMAN, Shared Valuing and Frameworks for Practical
Reasoning, in STRUCTURES OF AGENCY 283, 303 (2007).
288 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 160, at 6 ("Much of the time, dissenters benefit others,
while conformists benefit themselves.").
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Rather, as devil's advocates, outliers raise potential deficiencies to the special
officer, judge, group, and attorneys. 289 Second, if Vioxx challengers contend
that the settlement is unfair, then Judge Fallon would review the settlement's
fairness in a limited way. As suggested, he would first conduct a process-
dependent check, which looks for process-based defects such as tainted
consent. Depending on this result, he would then conduct a content-dependent
check of the settlement's substantive terms with more or less rigor.290 If the
process is flawed, then he would scrutinize the settlement's substance more
intensely. And if process is the product of an autonomous agent's freely given
and fully informed consent, then he should conduct this content-dependent
review with a light touch.
CONCLUSION
As British social philosopher Stuart Hampshire surmised, we will never
agree on substantive good in our modem, pluralistic society, but "fairness in
procedure is an invariable value, a constant in human nature. . . . [T]here is
everywhere a well-recognized need for procedures for conflict resolution,
which can replace brute force and domination and tyranny." 291 Admittedly, no
approach - including "litigating together" - is flawless; involving plaintiffs in
decision-making is thorny and deliberation is messy and time-consuming. Nor
is "litigating together" as clean or efficient as letting plaintiffs' attorneys work
as puppeteers behind the scenes to reach a silent accord with the defendant.
But it is more transparent and legitimate. It furthers litigants' faith in the
judicial system and makes it less likely that they will collaterally attack the
result or feel that they can morally rationalize disobedience.
To explain why this approach is better than our current practices in a way
that is consistent with the axioms of those promoting either welfare
maximization or individual justice, it (1) is efficient and promotes deterrence
and (2) maintains fidelity to the roots of individual consent. For example,
when social norms and other-regarding preferences influence litigant behavior,
these internalized behaviors require less judicial coercion and involvement.2 92
As to how this approach might promote instrumental tort-law objectives
such as achieving optimal deterrence, I can offer only a few speculations. First
take David Rosenberg's view - that plaintiffs' attorneys have less incentive to
invest in a tort's merits than do defendants - and recast it slightly: plaintiffs'
attorneys have less incentive to invest in a tort's merits because they prefer a
289 See Rubenstein, supra note 115, at 1453-56 (advocating for court-appointed attorneys
to argue against class action settlements).
290 Group Consensus, Individual Consent, supra note 13, at 22-25.
291 STUART HAMPSHIRE, JUSTICE IS CONFLICT 4-5 (2000).
292 Most scholars regard a social norm "as a rule governing an individual's behavior that
is diffusely enforced by third parties other than state agents by means of social sanctions."
Ellickson, supra note 234, at 35.
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quick settlement and assume that a monetary payoff will satisfy their clients.
Distilled, this means that plaintiffs' attorneys lack optimal incentives because
of agency problems. If we alleviate these agency problems with client
monitoring and clients insist that "It's not about the money!," 293 then the
attorneys lack authority to exchange their client's rights for a hasty settlement
without regard to the merits. On the flip side, clients who litigate purely on
principle might still lead to sub-optimal deterrence. If they want to bleed a
drug company until it can barely afford to manufacture pharmaceuticals, then
the utilitarian cost-benefit analysis is similarly problematic. But here enters
the special officer as the voice of reason, as a leader, as someone who has the
plaintiffs' interests at heart but the bigger picture in mind.
Take now the other classical view, that of the individual autonomist. If we
define autonomy as an individual's ability to make choices for herself about
her legal rights, such as when, where, and whether to sue; how to conduct the
litigation; and whether to settle, then we see that neither this litigating-together
approach nor current handling procedures preserve autonomy in its purest
form.294 That is, because of the resources needed to develop a mass-tort case,
only the richest could avoid amassing by plaintiffs' attorneys and even then,
they would likely face procedural lumping. But if we focus on informed
consent, this alternative approach avoids the paternalism inherent in class-
action litigation and preserves consent in its purest form. Plaintiffs still decide
when and whether to sue individually and whether they will join the group or
remain outliers. If they join the group, then they can participate through
discussion, problem-solving, and collective decision-making. They consent to
a process. Even if they decide to exchange their individual right to accept or
reject their portion of the settlement for a vote under an intraclaimant-
governance agreement, they do so only after informed consent and after
determining that the exchange best promotes their ends.
Most importantly, however, is what's different about this litigating-together
approach. It claims that we cannot achieve justice solely through maximizing
welfare or ensuring that plaintiffs have free choice. Instead, plaintiffs reason
together about the right thing to do. Banding together enables plaintiffs to do
something that they couldn't do, or at least may not be able to do as
successfully, alone: pursue and enforce their substantive rights. When that
process brings plaintiffs together, gives voice to their stories, weaves those
stories into a larger narrative, and enables them to make sense of that narrative
as part of a broader community that collectively pursues its communal values,
293 Relis, supra note 55, at 701.
294 Richard A. Nagareda, Autonomy, Peace, and Put Options in the Mass Tort Class
Action, 115 HARV. L. REv. 747, 750 (2002); Martin H. Redish & Nathan D. Larsen, Class
Actions, Litigant Autonomy, and the Foundations of Procedural Due Process, 95 CAL. L.
REv. 1573, 1574 (2007) ("Government imposed paternalism should be no less acceptable
when it comes to the individual's ability to resort to the judicial process . . . .").
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we begin to see that process can be about so much more than welfare
maximization or individual autonomy.
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